As senior members of the House Armed Services Committee, we are concerned that unless we recalibrate our approach to defense technology acquisition, we will continue on the slow, costly and unsustainable path that threatens our national defense and the rules-based international order.

Over the last 10 years, through numerous National Defense Authorization Acts, Congress has passed a variety of authorities to help streamline research and development and acquisition. These include more flexible other transaction authorities, mid-tier acquisition authorities, the Accelerate the Procurement and Fielding of Innovative Technologies program and protections for commercial technology to help better attract nontraditional companies to the defense sector.

Similarly, DOD has taken some steps of its own. The efforts of the late Defense Secretary Ash Carter, continued and expanded by leaders in subsequent administrations on a bipartisan basis, led to the creation of the Defense Innovation Unit, the Strategic Capabilities Office and the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office. Current efforts — such as Replicator and the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve — show promise in accelerating acquisition and development for certain capabilities.

These legislative and policy efforts intended to streamline, enhance and wring efficiencies from the acquisition system have left a dizzying array of authorities available to program managers and procurement officials. However, rather than fully utilizing these authorities, DOD still largely follows a slow and costly acquisition process hamstrung by a focus on the process and rigid requirements rather than fielding a capability and achieving results.

Furthermore, officials are more reliably punished for failures than rewarded for creativity and adaptability. Worse yet, they are incentivized to make decisions that may look good during their tenure but create unacceptable risks, cost growth or program management problems for successors. Cultural risk aversion drives a dangerous and costly tendency — one that too often results in cutting-edge technology becoming stale and outdated by the time it is put into play, if not earlier.

We also need to change how DOD interacts with Congress. Bold ideas require early collaboration which does not fit into the model where nothing can be disclosed or discussed with Congress until the president’s budget is released. Surprising Congress with new ideas historically has not benefited any part of the government. No one should be surprised when those ideas go unsupported.

Even when empowered offices overcome these structural disincentives, the efforts tend to be narrowly scoped. Large programs of record for complex systems or large services contracts are built around onerous requirements or meaningless metrics rather than problem-solving ideas or desired outcomes. Narrow technical requirements need to change to broad capability requirements.

The fiscal 2024 NDAA tasks DOD with modernizing the requirements process by avoiding prescriptive language, focusing on mission outcomes and assessed threats, enabling a more iterative and collaborative approach with the services and maximizing the use of commercial products. We expect to be briefed on an interim implementation report in the coming weeks. Getting this right is an absolute imperative.

We are likewise concerned that our research and development proving grounds are dangerously overtaxed. Years of chronic underinvestment have created unacceptable delays in test schedules. Rigorous exercise and experimentation, vital to transitioning technologies into capabilities, are hamstrung by the lack of facilities needed to develop disruptive technologies.

Finally, Congress itself is part of the problem. Parochialism, overly restrictive and inflexible appropriations, risk aversion and an unfortunate habit of killing messengers — to say nothing of the corrosive and wasteful use of continuing resolutions — create dangerous barriers to agility and innovation. The final report of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform Commission lays out many of these issues in more detail.

We cannot legislate cultural change, nor can the Defense Department implement it by policy. But we can adjust the incentives, behaviors and signals that drive cultural change over time and our ability to do so is unparalleled.

We have the most innovative economy in the world. We have the best universities, capital markets and entrepreneurial spirit. It is our duty to make sure the government can access that unmatched advantage in an effective way to give our military what it needs to meet our national security needs.

U.S. Rep. Mike Rogers, D-Ala., is chairman of the House Armed Services Committee; Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., is ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee; Rep. Don Bacon, R-Neb., is chairman of the Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies and Innovation; and Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Calif., is ranking member of the Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies and Innovation.

In a full-blown war with Iran, these existing bases will be rendered unusable by sustained Iranian attack. The Iranians can see this and have created a large and very capable missile and drone force in part to exploit this situation.

Therefore, we need to reexamine where we are based in the region, both on a day-to-day and contingency basis.

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Our presence at existing bases provides an important assurance mission to host countries. Thus, we are unlikely to permanently leave bases like Al Dhafra in the United Arab Emirates and Al Udeid in Qatar.

We should, however, work with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman and Egypt to identify bases as far to the west as possible where we can deploy aircraft, maintenance capabilities, refueling capabilities and weapons.

We have already done some of this work. The “Western Basing Network” was a joint U.S.-Saudi decision to evaluate bases near the Red Sea for use in times of war. Not as far advanced but still under consideration were basing concepts that included Oman, Egypt and Jordan. The U.S. Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid has also shifted some of its responsibilities to locations in the United States, significantly reducing air command and control vulnerabilities.

How does this approach, known as “agile combat employment,” work? Based on warnings and indications of war, land-based air assets would relocate to the western bases from their locations along the Arabian Gulf. The number of Iranian weapons that could reach them would be significantly reduced, warning times would be increased and the Iranians would have a targeting problem in ascertaining from which bases U.S. aircraft operated.

In the event of hostilities, these aircraft would launch from the distant bases, be refueled en route and conduct combat operations over Iran. Depending on how the fight was going, they could land and refuel/rearm at the existing forward bases on the Arabian Gulf, minimizing their time on the ground, and increasing their “cycle rate.” Regardless, they would return to the western bases to “bed down.”

However, access to these installations is not guaranteed. The necessary political decisions are not necessarily made quickly in this region. The facilities themselves range from “bare bones” bases to fully equipped ones. Nonetheless, this is something that is squarely in the best interest of all concerned.

There is a second component to this new basing construct, and it is the opportunity made possible by Israel’s 2021 entry into the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). It is now possible to consider basing in Israel in the event of a war with Iran. It has the same geographic advantages as basing in western Saudi Arabia or other Arab states. Additionally, Israel has a powerful, proven air and missile defense capability. The fact that Israel is now in CENTCOM also facilitates training, interoperability, and even maintenance. Israel should certainly be at the forefront of possible basing alternatives.

The third component to the basing solution also involves Israel, and it is the growing normalization of ties with Arab states. This was made diplomatically possible by the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020. It was made operationally feasible by Israel’s move into the CENTCOM AOR. It was further underwritten by Iranian malign behavior which has finally convinced the Gulf States that a collective approach to air and missile defense is necessary, practicable and achievable without sacrificing sovereignty. It is largely a matter of sharing tactics, techniques, and procedures and agreeing what sensor information to share, and how to share it, with the U.S. acting as the honest broker.

We have a clear-cut example of this concept at work. The Iranians’ large, complex attack against Nevatim Airfield in Israel on April 13, 2024, failed because of Israeli competence, U.S. and allied assistance and the cooperation and assistance of Arab neighbors. Information was shared; airspace was shared. In every measurable way, this was a remarkable success story.

Deterrence must be continuous; in the Middle East, it can have a very short half-life unless it is refreshed systematically. The events of the past two months clearly show that Iran can be deterred from undertaking irresponsible and deadly attacks in the region, but this requires resources, careful messaging and the demonstrated ability to fight and win if necessary.

We now need to move aggressively to develop basing alternatives that demonstrate that we are prepared to fight and prevail in a sustained, high-intensity war with Iran. Geography is destiny for some, but not for all. Being obviously ready to rebase rapidly, and frequently exercising the capability, will increase the chances of peace in the region, because Iran will be watching.

Gen. McKenzie, a retired U.S. Marine general, served as commander of U.S. Central Command from 2019 to 2022. He is the Hertog Distinguished Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America and author of “The Melting Point: High Command and War in the 21st Century.”

Ukraine had wanted more. It has repeatedly sought permission to use U.S.-built Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles for long-range strikes deep in Russia. They have a range of up to 190 miles and, with their speed, are better able to hit mobile targets. Prior to Zelenskyy’s visit, there were hints the U.S. might provide Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM). Unlike ATACMS missiles, these missiles are abundant in the U.S. arsenal, and their stealth capability make them more effective at hitting defended targets.

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Sentiment in NATO is growing to give Ukraine more scope for action. This month the European Parliament asked European Union members to “immediately” lift deep strike restrictions, and so have top U.S. House Republicans and several leading congressional Democrats. Nonetheless, the U.S. approach remains hesitant.

There may be risks. On Sept. 25, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned an attack on Russia by a state backed by a nuclear power could lead to a nuclear response. He often cries nuclear wolf, but this time, his timing suggested worry that Biden might cave to pressures and unleash Ukraine to conduct more deep attacks.

A Russian nuclear response, however, seems unlikely and would probably bring little, if any, military gain. Russian troops are not trained to fight on a nuclear battlefield, as in the Cold War. Ukraine has few, if any, concentrated, high-value military targets. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have warned Putin not to go nuclear, while Biden has warned of “catastrophic consequences” if he does.

There is also a risk that some JASSMs might miss their targets or not be fully destroyed. Russia — and China — could analyze the debris to try to learn more about their stealth capability and sensitive electronics.

Time and again when Ukrainian forces have surprised or shocked Russia — from destroying or damaging one-third of its Black Sea fleet to seizing territory in Russia’s Kursk region — the Kremlin’s response has been weak. Suffering steep manpower losses and needing arms from Iran and North Korea, Russian forces may face limitations.

To its credit, Ukraine is doing a lot on its own to strike deep inside Russia. On Sept. 18, it carried out a stunning attack in Russia’s Tver region, blowing up a huge weapons depot in a blast akin to an earthquake. To overwhelm air defenses, Ukraine used over 100 slow-flying drones. The depot was 300 miles away from Ukraine, well beyond the 190-mile range of ATACMS missiles.

A welcome surprise has been Ukraine’s high-tech drone innovation. Former CIA Director General David Petraeus called it “unprecedented” in scale and pace. Even more is coming. Last month, Zelenskyy said Ukraine had deployed its first high-speed missile-drone, the Palianytsia.

But Ukraine needs more long-range strike power than its own aviation sector can provide. U.S. arms may be a valuable complement, despite their higher cost.

Last spring the U.S. began sending the long-range variant of ground-to-ground ATACMS missiles to Ukraine for use inside its territory. In occupied Crimea, they have ravaged Russia’s navy and air defenses and supporting infrastructure. ATACMS missiles are responsive and can hit mobile targets that elude drones. In June, the U.S. allowed Ukraine some added flexibility — to strike across the border inside Russia with ATACMS missiles wherever enemy forces were engaged in attacks.

On Sept. 26, Biden also promised to send hundreds more Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM). Armed with them, Ukraine’s F-16s could shoot down some Russian combat aircraft in flight before they release devastating glide bombs.

The long-range strike mission is important for Ukraine, but so are other factors. It faces challenges in several areas, including a soldier shortage, inadequate defensive fortifications and uncertainties about future Western aid.

Nonetheless, the U.S. could benefit Ukraine by doing more to help it to conduct long-range strikes in Russia. Neither U.S. weapons nor Ukraine’s, by themselves, are enough. Together, they could raise the cost to Russia of its perfidy and help strengthen European security.

William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND research institution and was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia, and a U.S.-Soviet commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

John Hoehn is an associate policy researcher at RAND and a former military analyst with the Congressional Research Service.

That follows, and at least partially contradicts, previous reporting from Reuters, and Pentagon spokesman Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder could not provide clarity Thursday when asked.

A premature U.S. departure from Iraq that ignores the advice of military leaders and conditions on the ground risks repeating the mistakes of past withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan and catalyzing an ISIS resurgence.

Under the U.S.-Iraqi Higher Military Commission, the United States and Iraq have agreed to discuss a transition to a “new phase of the bilateral security relationship,” though it remains unclear what that relationship would look like and how the U.S. force presence in Iraq would be impacted.

While the details of the future U.S. military posture in Iraq remain murky, the consequences of a premature withdrawal are clear.

General Kurilla, the commander of U.S. Central Command, warned Congress in March that a withdrawal of the U.S.-led coalition “would all but guarantee ISIS’ return if it occurred before Iraqi Security Forces were ready to stand on their own.”

Similar warnings were issued in 2011 before a U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq that catalyzed a series of events that led to the establishment of the ISIS caliphate and forced American forces to return in 2014.

Kurilla, in his testimony, also reiterated that the U.S. force presence in Syria would be significantly impacted without a military presence in Iraq. In July, CENTCOM announced that ISIS was attempting to reconstitute and was on track to double its number of attacks in Iraq and Syria.

While the ISIS caliphate is defeated, ISIS the terrorist organization is not. Two recent raids by U.S. forces demonstrate the persistent threat of ISIS and the continued operational role of U.S. forces in the country.

On Aug. 29, U.S. and Iraqi forces conducted a partnered raid in western Iraq to disrupt and degrade ISIS’ ability to plan and conduct attacks “throughout the region and beyond,” according to a Central Command statement.

Fourteen ISIS fighters were killed, including ISIS senior leaders overseeing operations in in the region, and seven U.S. service members were injured.

Just days later, on Sept. 1, U.S. forces partnered with Syrian Democratic Forces to capture an ISIS leader who was helping ISIS fighters escape detention in Syria.

Meanwhile, Iranian proxies have attacked U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria over 170 times since October, placing pressure on the Iraqi government to secure a U.S. withdrawal while putting American troops in further danger and detracting from their intended defeat-ISIS mission. A leading grand strategic goal of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to evict U.S. military forces from Iraq and Syria.

Some officials within the Iraqi government have pushed for the departure of the U.S.-led coalition, but the Iraqi Foreign Ministry delayed a formal announcement in August.

On Sept. 12, though, the Iraqi Defense Minister said that Iraq and the United States had reached an agreement to withdraw the majority of U.S. and coalition troops in two unspecified stages beginning this year and concluding in 2026 as part of a transition to a “sustainable security partnership.”

But a withdrawal of U.S. forces from non-Kurdish parts of Iraq could make Americans in Baghdad more vulnerable and cause concern among many Sunnis, creating fertile ground for ISIS radicalization, recruitment and resurgence.

A more complete American withdrawal that also included the departure of U.S. forces from Kurdistan would likely be a disaster, exacerbating Sunni concerns and making it much more difficult logistically for the Pentagon to support U.S. troops in Syria.

The warnings of military leaders and recent operations demonstrate the danger of an ISIS resurgence and the continued importance of U.S. forces in preventing such an outcome. But they are also a reminder that American service members continue to put themselves in harm’s way in Iraq and Syria waging a war that some Americans seem to have forgotten.

If the United States intends to keep U.S. troops in harm’s way to protect vital interests, Washington must ensure that our fellow citizens in uniform have the means to defend themselves and the permission to strike back with overwhelming force when they are attacked.

The United States must also ensure that its forces are operating with reliable partners and under a coherent strategy rather than conducting sporadic raids and airstrikes while its forces are subjected to regular attacks by Iranian terror proxies, including some militias that are part of the Iraqi security architecture.

The future U.S. military posture in Iraq remains uncertain. But if past is prologue, we can be confident that a U.S. military withdrawal that ignores conditions on the ground will not end well.

Cameron McMillan is a research analyst at FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power, where Bradley Bowman is the senior director.

While many aspects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine resemble World War I — trenches, barbed wires, heavy exchanges of artillery — the innovative use of drones has been game-changing. Unmanned systems are altering the character of warfare, and the ongoing integration of AI and robotics will further accelerate this dramatic shift. It is why these were my top modernization objectives during my tenure as Army secretary and secretary of defense.

The potency of unmanned systems is most pronounced when it comes to small aerial drones — essentially robots — that are used today to conduct the same tasks that soldiers performed in the past: reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting and direct attack. But they do it far more efficiently and accurately. For instance, when I was a platoon leader decades ago, it typically took a couple infantrymen to destroy a tank at a max range of 3,750 meters. Today, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) can do the same at far greater distances, with better success, and at much less cost.

To date, Ukraine has destroyed over 10,000 Russian vehicles, nearly one-third of which are tanks. Many of these were killed by UAVs. Ukraine has also had great success using unmanned surface vehicles to sink or damage a number of Russian ships in the Black Sea.

The introduction of drone swarms — think of dozens or hundreds of UAVs being employed simultaneously — will make the battlefield more lethal than ever before. From a production perspective, generating such a number is not an arduous task. At a gathering this summer of the Aspen Strategy Group that focused on AI, I co-led a panel discussion where one former U.S. official reported that Kyiv is acquiring well over 50,000 drones a month. The speed and cost at which the Ukrainians can do this compared to the United States is shocking.

As important, because the software on these drones is easily modified, Ukraine’s military can keep up with the changing threats and tactics of the modern battlefield. This is something many of our existing platforms, which are defined — and usually trapped in time — by their hardware, often cannot do. The good news is that this can be remedied with more investment in American innovation and process changes.

AI is also revolutionizing a wide range of administrative and logistical functions far removed from the front lines. It will do what AI does best: improve the speed, accuracy, cost and quality of decision-making. Artificial Intelligence can be used for preventive maintenance to reduce the likelihood of equipment breaking down during the fight; it can ensure the right supplies get to the right place at the right time; it can improve talent management in the force; transform supply chain risk management in the defense industrial base; and the use of large language models can hyperpower military staffs. This is the future for a broad range of ordinary military tasks, in addition to enhancing our warfighters’ effectiveness and survivability on the battlefield.

All this demands that DOD accelerate its across-the-board adoption of AI and advancement of robotics and autonomy. It is an asymmetric advantage the U.S. must master first and retain preeminence over. This means investing far more in these technologies, adopting commercial standards and processes as much as possible, capturing all the department’s data in a central repository, prototyping and testing far more aggressively and showing a willingness to deploy needed systems even when one’s confidence level is less than 100%. At the same time, the Pentagon must continue to do these things responsibly, beginning with the ethical principles for AI that I established in February 2020.

As the war in Ukraine rages on, we must heed the lessons from it and do everything in our power to ensure our military has the advanced AI, robotics and autonomy tools it needs to fight — and win — the battles of tomorrow. Doing so, and with a far greater sense of urgency, will serve us incredibly well in any future conflict; especially if we must face off against our greatest strategic threat today — a People’s Republic of China — with the world’s largest and most concentrated armed forces.

Dr. Mark T. Esper was the 27th secretary of defense and author of the New York Times bestseller, “A Sacred Oath: Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense During Extraordinary Times.” He is also a partner and board member in the AI venture firm Red Cell Partners.

I was the last U.S. nuclear testing negotiator with the USSR before it collapsed in 1991. My opposite, a top Soviet nuclear figure, did not hide his fury at Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, for ending testing in 1990.

Today, Russia is increasing its reliance on nuclear arms in threatening Ukraine. Recently, Moscow hosted a nuclear exercise near Ukraine and another in Belarus. Russia may also have moved “several dozen” tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. A resumption of nuclear testing would further escalate this nuclear intimidation.

Efforts to end nuclear tests date to 1963, when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, forcing nuclear tests underground. In 1974, the two countries signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, limiting test yields to 150 kilotons of TNT, or 10 times the Hiroshima blast.

International negotiations in the 1990s produced a draft Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). But the U.S. Senate refused to consent to the Treaty in 1999and it has not entered into force. Opponents faulted the CTBT for being unverifiable and risking the viability of the U.S. deterrent. Proponents said the pact would lock in U.S. design superiority and help deter the spread of nuclear weapons.

Both Russia and the U.S. say they have not conducted tests that would undermine the CTBT. But the U.S. has charged Russia with undertaking secret “supercritical” tests (producing a self-sustaining fission chain reaction).

Since ending nuclear testing in 1992, the U.S. has assessed the performance of its nuclear arms through research and modeling, testing electrical components, and sub-critical nuclear testing. Russia lacks the best supercomputers, but its weapons may have greater tolerances and be easier to assess. Some Russian specialists likely favor new nuclear testing to improve warhead designs or address aging or corrosion.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in June that “if necessary, we will conduct” nuclear tests, but there was no need yet. If Russia does test, it is likely to abide by the limits prescribed by the Limited Test Ban and the Threshold Test Ban agreements—but not allow U.S. on-site monitoring.

A “demonstrative” blast, suggested by a Putin ally, might be aimed at pressuring the West to cease military support for Ukraine. But the West would surely refuse.

The U.S. has warned of “catastrophic consequences” if Russia were to strike Ukraine with nuclear arms. But despite Moscow’s heightened nuclear threats, NATO officials say no changes are needed in the alliance’s nuclear posture.

A Russian resumption of nuclear testing could change this calculus. The Kremlin could view the lack of a U.S. or NATO nuclear response to its intimidation as a sign of weakness. But a U.S. or NATO nuclear military response might be the only way to induce Russia to pull back from its irresponsible nuclear behavior.

One such response could be for the U.S. to resume nuclear testing. This would show determination, and perhaps bring some technical benefit. But testing would be costly if it’s not needed for technical reasons, it may draw strong international criticism, and it could provide political cover for proliferators to test. This seems like an unattractive option.

Another option could be for the U.S. to deploy new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-Ns), which Congress is already funding. The U.S. Navy is reluctant to encumber warships that already have conventional missions. But SLCM-N deployments could enhance NATO’s theater nuclear posture and raise the military cost to Russia of its nuclear threats.

Third, the U.S. and NATO could put nuclear forces in Poland if it were interested. The U.S. would have to provide Poland with dual-capable F-35 aircraft to deliver nuclear bombs. (Warsaw is already buying another F-35 variant.) This option could respond directly to Russia’s movement of nuclear arms into Belarus, and it could enhance NATO’s theater nuclear posture.

A 1997 NATO-Russia accord states that the alliance has “no intention, no plan, and no reason” to put nuclear arms in new member states. But Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and nuclear intimidation would seem to render this pledge obsolete.

A U.S. or NATO nuclear military response might be the only way to induce Russia to pull back from its irresponsible nuclear behavior.

William Courtney, an adjunct senior fellow at RAND, was U.S. Commissioner in negotiations with the USSR to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and subsequently ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia.

This op-ed was updated after publication to correct the year of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

To do so would irreparably damage the credibility of these countries, set back decades of progress towards better legal protection of civilians in armed conflict and betray the commitment to a rules-based international order which NATO countries and many others seek to defend, including in the current Russia-Ukraine conflict.

What is particularly unfortunate is that the authors argue for such a dramatic reversal without providing a facts-based analysis of the military effectiveness of cluster munitions, either historically or in the Ukraine conflict.

States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions banned such weapons both because of the unacceptable harm they consistently inflict on civilians and due to the inaccuracy, unreliability, and limited military effectiveness of these antiquated area weapons. They are, in effect, a crude weapon of the Cold War period with most existing stocks approaching or past their intended period of use.

Since their peak production period during the Cold War, a wide array of more accurate and reliable weapons has become available. While a weapon that can spread 600-700 submunitions over thousands of square meters represents impressive destructive capacity, the reality is that most of these submunitions don’t hit anything. The UK Defense Ministry’s June 2000 report “Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis” concluded that tens of thousands of British cluster submunitions had destroyed only a few dozen military objects and that “it would have been useful to have a capability to strike single vehicles more accurately,”

Similarly, a Dutch military representative in an April 2024 meeting in Oslo on explosive weapons stated that the Netherlands no longer has cluster munitions or other area weapons because it prefers munitions that will hit their targets directly.

A U.S. General Accounting Office report on the 1991 Gulf War concluded that cluster munitions significantly impeded military operations and “in some cases ground movement came to a halt because ground units were afraid of encountering unexploded ordnance.” In addition, they also killed or injured 100 US soldiers and another 100 clearance workers.

Following the 2003 Gulf War a “lessons learned” report by the U.S. Third Infantry Division, cited by Human Rights Watch, included cluster munitions among the “losers” of the war, asking pointedly, “Is the DPICM (cluster munition) a Cold War relic?” and reporting that commanders were “hesitant to use it” but “had to” in the absence of alternative weapons.

What is beyond a doubt is that the historically high failure rates of cluster munitions, from 5% to 40% depending on the model and age of munitions used, results in massive contamination for which civilians and their communities consistently pay the highest price. This lethal contamination is a result of the incredibly complex design of the munitions, deployment in the heat of battle at altitudes and airspeeds inconsistent with the design, and the decades-old age of most cluster munitions in existing stockpiles.

Failure rates are consistently higher than manufacturers claim, often due to the difference between failures under ideal testing conditions and those in the real world. In areas in which civilians and military are co-mingled, civilians inevitably are killed and injured due to the indiscriminate wide-area nature of cluster munitions.

Children, who are attracted by the small colorful canisters of unexploded submunitions, are common victims, along with civilians attempting to remove them to access the rubble of their homes, farmers attempting to remove them from their lands, and clearance personnel toiling for years to remove them from destroyed buildings, forests, hillsides, swamps, and agricultural areas.

According the 2023 Cluster Munition Monitor report, at least 95% of those killed or wounded by cluster munitions in 2022 were civilians, and children accounted for 71% of casualties from cluster munition remnants where the age was known.

The authors of the Defense News article not only welcome Lithuania’s regrettable decision in July 2024 to withdraw from the CCM but also call on NATO countries to resume production of cluster munitions. Such new production would be inconsistent with U.S. Defense Secretary Austin’s assurance in July 2023 that U.S. cluster munition transfers to Ukraine were but a “bridging capability” until production of other (presumably less objectionable) weapons picks up.

Do the authors really want to redirect European arms production away from more modern weapons to production of weapons that have been labelled a “Cold War relic”? In considering the authors’ misguided call for NATO States Party to the CCM to withdraw, European states should reflect long and hard about the grave implications of any such decision for the fabric of international humanitarian law, a body of norms built up over generations out of the rubble of the Second World War to better protect both civilians and combatants.

Despite hundreds of armed conflicts in past decades, no state has withdrawn from any of the key global treaties banning an entire category of weapons, from the landmark 1949 Geneva Conventions or their 1977 Additional Protocols. Respect for these norms has collectively prevented untold suffering in conflicts of past decades. A call to effectively dismantle any one of these conventions is unconscionable.

Heeding this call would also be a victory for Russia, further undermining the rule of law and creating dissent among NATO allies. Now is the time to recommit to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, not undermine it.

We therefore call on NATO States party to the CCM to deplore Lithuania’s decision to withdraw.

They must take the opportunity of the September 10-14 meeting of CCM States Parties in Geneva to call on Lithuania to suspend its withdrawal process and engage in dialogue with other States Parties, the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society about the historic failure of cluster munitions and their unacceptable humanitarian impacts that led to the Convention in the first place.

Peter Herby is the head of Petersburg Partnerships, a consultancy on arms-related humanitarian issues based in Geneva. Previously he was head of the Arms Unit for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, 1997-2012). In this capacity Herby played an instrumental role in public advocacy on cluster munitions from 2001 and led the ICRC’s team that negotiated the CCM in Dublin in 2008.

Tamar Gabelnick is Director of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), a global civil society coalition seeking an end the suffering caused by landmines and cluster munitions. Previously she was Policy Director of ICBL-CMC (2005-2015), where she participated in the negotiations of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and led the coalition’ global advocacy work on convention implementation.

Several of them were used in the September 2019 Iranian-orchestrated attack against Saudi Aramco’s oil terminals in Khurais and Abqaiq, which temporarily knocked out 5% of the world’s oil supply. Shahed-136 drones are also among the Houthis’ weapons of choice to strike commercial vessels transiting in the Red Sea and Hormuz Strait, wreaking havoc on global maritime trade and connectivity.

Their effectiveness in the Ukrainian theater, however, seems on a declining trajectory. In recent months, Ukraine has been improving its counter-drone and low-tier air defense capabilities by expanding its early-warning network of fixed distributed radar, electro-optical and acoustic sensors. The military also has been training new “mobile fire groups” specialized in hunting Shahed and other one-way attack drones, the vast majority of which are shot down.

Aggregate data collected by this author and based on official numbers released by the Ukrainian Air Force indicate that the interception rate of Shahed UAS has steadily increased in the past five months, with an average of 91% since March 2024.

By comparison, the average Shahed interception rate during the previous 6 months was 80%, with the highest figure of 83% recorded in November last year. Ukraine’s growing success against the Shaheds stems from the combination of widespread multispectrum sensor coverage and effective tactics, techniques and procedures. As for hardware, Ukrainian forces have fielded a mix of mobile counter-UAS and short-range air defense capabilities for combine electronic warfare (EW), anti-aircraft guns such as ZU-23-2 and German-made Gepard, shoulder-fired air defense systems such as Stinger and Igla, and cost-effective laser-guided rockets such as the U.S.-provided advanced precision kill weapon system (APKWS).

These operations can also include the use of medium-range air defenses and tactical aviation, thus requiring smooth coordination between ground-based fire teams, brigade command posts and aviation headquarters to deconflict and avoid friendly-fire incidents.

Overall, the Shaheds’ decreasing effectiveness is proportional to the improvement of Ukraine’s C-UAS and short-range air defense (SHORAD) capabilities and demystifies the drone’s overhyped operational impact often pushed across the mainstream debate. In fact, sufficiently dense, layered countermeasures – and the trained personnel required – are perfectly capable of dealing with Shahed and other one-way attack UAS, to the disappointment of “game-changer” theorists and drone-fetishist commentators.

Far from being arcane or expensive, these countermeasures should complement direct attacks against enemy drone teams and infrastructure and consist of cost-effective solutions such as anti-aircraft guns with airburst ammunition, MANPADS, and low-tier guided interceptors, like BAE Systems’ APKWS 70mm laser-guided rocket and Raytheon’s Coyote Block II+ missiles.

Defensive solutions to the threat posed by Shahed and other one-way attack drones are already out there and should be scaled up by NATO allies without hesitation. The only question is whether governments and planners across the alliance decide to invest in scalable low-cost interceptors and short-range air defense capabilities amidst many other defense priorities.

Nevertheless, while Shaheds’ effectiveness is diminishing, it would be a mistake to underestimate the threat these and other one-way attack drones pose. As seen in Ukraine and elsewhere, these systems can be used to reveal the positions of air defense assets, deplete air-defense interceptor stocks, and siphon capability resources that could be used elsewhere, while even a few systems (e.g., 2-3%) that manage to reach their target can provoke serious destruction, especially against critical infrastructure. In addition, the drones’ effectiveness dramatically increases when used as part of saturation attacks combining long-range missiles.

But this problem is hardly an unsolvable one and should be high on the defense agenda of NATO countries.

Federico Borsari is a resident fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), where he also leads the Defense Technology Initiative.

But within the Pentagon and the services, AI ambition does not match current budgetary realities.

And while more money is rarely the answer to every Defense Department shortcoming, militaries are what they buy.

As a former Chief of Naval Operations and former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who continues to participate in non-governmental dialogues in Asia, to include with China, I’ve followed China’s impressive military growth.

Chinese ships, aircraft, and technology are not as good as ours, but they are buying more and rapidly getting better. The dialogue agendas and discussions have also evolved, to include transformational technologies with AI top of mind. Unquestionably, as we move deeper into the AI modernization war, Beijing is buying in that space and doubling down.

Years ago, the Air Force and Navy began creating a new sixth-generation, AI-powered fighter jet to outpace the one China is developing.

That project subsequently split into two separate approaches — the F/A-XX for the Navy and the Next Generation Air Dominance System (NGAD) for the Air Force. Although one is launched from the land and one from the sea, they possess the same objective: to remain globally dominant in the air and to help the United States be the first nation to realize true AI-powered air warfare. The only way to do that is to create these two new AI warfighting systems.

But the Fiscal Responsibility Act that Congress passed last year has hamstrung the U.S. military budget. The Navy and the Air Force are now stuck. In March, the Navy delayed a full $1 billion of funding for its F/A-XX system. The Air Force forewarned that it, too, might soon need to make “tough decisions” about NGAD, including potentially ending the entire program.

That must not happen. China is already closing in on the United States’ militarily. Its new fighter system will be ready by 2035. If the U.S. does not advance fully, our air dominance will become jeopardized.

The AI race is on and shaping the future of warfare. The global military AI market is nearly $9 billion today and is expected to approach $25 billion by 2032. China and the malign countries in its circle want China to become the AI dominant player. Delaying or pausing America’s AI warfighting modernization initiatives like the F/A-XX and NGAD make that goal attainable.

Bold statements of commitment ring hollow when we re-phase or delay our transformational programs. Our deferred outcomes and lack of real urgency are pleasing to Beijing, which has set 2035 as the year China will complete its military modernization effort. The Pentagon, particularly the Air Force and Navy, must set their budgets to deliver these critical systems faster. Congress, in providing for the common defense, must enable these critical programs with funding needed to win the military AI race, because in warfare, there is no second place.

In many respects, China is already ahead. Beijing’s civil-military fusion approach is alive and well. The infrastructure, techniques, and processes that have made China the global manufacturing center of gravity also nurtures along rapid military delivery and improvement.

This is seen in the maritime domain. Between 2015 and 2020, China’s navy, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), eclipsed the size of America’s Navy, and the gap continues to widen.

The Office of Naval Intelligence has assessed that China’s shipbuilding capacity far exceeds that of the United States because of its significantly larger military and commercial shipbuilding industry. According to the Pentagon’s China power report, the PLAN grew by 30 ships last year, while the U.S. added just two. That trend will likely continue as we’ve reduced our submarine buys in 2025 and delays plague our other shipbuilding programs.

The U.S. Air Force isn’t faring much better. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in march, Navy Adm. John Aquilino, then the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, assessed that “the world’s largest Navy [is] soon to be the world’s largest Air Force” and “the magnitude, scope, and scale of this security challenge cannot be understated.”

He’s right. China is producing 100 J-20 fighter aircraft annually, while the United States is turning out roughly 135 F-35s, with only 60 to 70 destined for our Air Force. As in shipbuilding, that’s a recipe for second place.

Beyond numbers, this is also about jobs, skills, and the myriad of companies that contribute to these extraordinary machines and the technology behind them. If we do not sustain American industry, we will lose it.

Gary Roughead is a former United States Navy officer who served as the 29th Chief of Naval Operations from 2007 to 2011. He previously served as Commander of the United States Fleet Forces Command from May 17 to September 29, 2007.

By doctrinal definition, ACE is the “proactive and reactive operational scheme of maneuver executed within threat timelines to increase survivability while generating combat power.” In translation, this means air forces must be able to flex from major regional bases to smaller or non-traditional operating sites to survive and continue operations.

Such operations require a challenging reconceptualization of everything in the generative process for airpower, including command and control, maintenance, logistics, and air and missile defense for ground operations, to name a few considerations. Developments in the strategic environment underscore that reconceptualization is also essential.

The Commission on the National Defense Strategy report released on July 30 echoes longstanding concerns of USAF leadership that adversaries will aggressively target overseas air bases to prevent them from being used to launch and recover aircraft. Consider the growing threats in the Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East and initial efforts to respond to challenges the services have not confronted in recent decades.

In the Pacific, Pentagon assessments note the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has the ballistic and cruise missiles to target regional air bases, ports, and ground infrastructure in Japan and the Philippines, as well as U.S. bases as far away as Guam. In a major contingency in the Taiwan Strait, the USAF must be able to sink ships and destroy adversary aircraft. It will be difficult to sustain that effort if American pilots have nowhere to land.

In Europe, Russian forces continue to use long-range fires, hypersonic missiles, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to target Ukrainian air operations on the ground. Eyeing these developments, even the newest NATO members, Sweden and Finland, are developing low-footprint air operations by landing advanced fighters on highways to refuel and re-arm while rapidly relocating both between and within bases.

How a new, mobile package keeps Reaper drones ready to fight in Europe

Since August 2020, U.S. Air Forces Central Command has telegraphed episodes of its ACE implementation in the Middle East for deterrent effect against Tehran. ACE maneuvers increased in complexity over time and included hot-pit refueling at non-traditional sites, tactical munitions ferrying to forward locations, agile airlift, dynamic command and control, and the deployment of mobile long-range fires for organic forward operating location defense. Most recently, these maneuvers incorporated aircraft launching from U.S. Air Forces Europe for a coalition exercise in the Middle East.

Despite these early ACE-related advances, the USAF seeks to institutionalize ACE in the premier exercise for intensive air combat training: Red Flag. The massive resources invested in recurring Red Flag exercises and large numbers of participants, including coalition partners, create a perennial opportunity for increasingly complex ACE training to reach the largest number of airmen. Traditionally, Red Flag emphasizes aerial combat and is designed to test aircraft, aircrew, maintainers, and flightline-adjacent capabilities. But the incorporation of Bamboo Eagle into Red Flag was a stress test of the entire chain of command and the ability of Air Force wings to execute a kill chain when forced to disaggregate and re-aggregate across operating locations.

Bamboo Eagle also rehearsed the employment of advanced technologies that make such distributed operations and dynamic re-tasking possible. Those technologies included “an architecture where we can talk to any aircraft, any command post, any entity that plays a role in this system, anywhere in the world in real time,” USAF Warfare Center Commander Maj. Gen. Christopher Niemi stated in a media call on Aug. 1.

At a time of growing threats in multiple regions, ACE operations or exercises can be used as a signal to adversaries to bolster deterrence. Such operations cast doubt in the minds of military planners whether they can effectively target U.S. combat forces. That, in turn, will increase adversary concerns that the costs associated with any American response could exceed any benefits associated with prospective aggression. In other words, ACE can play a fundamental role in strengthening both deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment.

So, how can Congress and the State Department help? Congress should press the Air Force for its lessons learned from Bamboo Eagle, focusing on steps to improve future exercises as well as efforts to implement lessons learned and strengthen the necessary capabilities.

Congress should also provide the funding necessary to conduct increasingly large and complex exercises that span multiple combatant commands and are scripted specifically to improve the capability and capacity of the USAF to implement ACE doctrine in a contested environment in support of joint operations.

Meanwhile, the State Department should redouble efforts to gain host nation approval for Department of Defense access to a larger number of airfields and operating locations while also exploring opportunities to work with allied nations to develop plans and civilian infrastructure that could rapidly be converted for operational use. This could include maintenance of straight roads or highways, reservation of nondescript storage facilities, and even the clearance of terrain to meet landing zone or drop zone criteria. Encouraging their low-cost investments could prove vital in combined major combat operations.

Finally, Congress should press the Army and Marine Corps to redouble investments in, and maximize procurements of, portable air defense and counter-UAS solutions that the effective employment of ACE requires. Those solutions must be operable by the smallest teams possible, set up in minutes rather than hours, and fit in the cargo hold of a C-130 or smaller platforms designed to land in the most austere locations.

Adversary capabilities are growing, and serious new conflicts may be on the horizon. There is no time to waste to ensure the USAF can sustain progress in conducting disaggregated combat operations.

Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Dr. Lydia LaFavor is a research fellow.

Under the leadership of Jens Stoltenberg, NATO embraced the Convention on Cluster Munitions, or CMC, in 2008, which barred 124 member nations from stockpiling, using or manufacturing these weapons due to their indiscriminate nature and long-term humanitarian impact.

But the grinding continuation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the largest European conflict since WWII, and the looming threat from a Russian and Chinese “friendship without limits” demands a strategic shift.

As such, NATO’s future effectiveness in deterring Russian aggression hinges on withdrawing from the treaty and resuming the production and deployment of cluster munitions.

The defense of Europe in the face of Russian aggression requires a pragmatic approach that balances moral obligations with strategic necessities. The CMC, while noble in intent, has proven to be a strategic liability.

It is incumbent upon NATO’s new leadership to correct this course, ensuring that the alliance remains capable of defending its member states against present and future threats. Withdrawing from the CMC and reinstating the use of cluster munitions is a difficult but necessary decision to strengthen NATO’s defense posture and secure peace in Europe.

Why the US is willing to send Ukraine cluster munitions now

It also makes little sense to remain part of a convention on arms control when future arms control deals are unlikely.

The CMC limits NATO capabilities while giving Russia time to build and maintain a defense industrial base that is already well ahead of Europe. The European defense industry has already struggled to produce conventional munitions and re-orienting toward cluster munition production too late could prove disastrous.

NATO under Stoltenberg has had two-and-a-half years of war in Ukraine to lead NATO out of the CMC debacle and suggest that all members withdraw.

However, Stoltenberg’s leading role in the inception of the CMC highlights the inherent contradiction between arms control and deterrence. Weakening NATO’s deterrence capabilities through adherence to the CMC potentially emboldens Russia by making Europe more vulnerable, risking greater loss of life in the event of conflict.

Stoltenberg’s tenure as NATO’s secretary general is marked by a significant contradiction. His role in founding the CMC was driven by humanitarian concerns, but as the leader of NATO, he is responsible for deterring Russian aggression.

At the 2008 CMC, Stoltenberg was quoted saying that “the treaty places moral obligations on all states not to use cluster munitions.” and “banning cluster bombs took too long. Too many people lost arms and legs.”

Despite the CMC’s push for other NATO members to join, European states under more direct threat from Russia — like Finland, Poland, Estonia, and Latvia — have refused to join the convention, leading to a bifurcated NATO.

Stoltenberg, despite his opposition to cluster munitions, has repeatedly suggested that Russia will not stop at Ukraine.

“I think there’s no doubt that President Putin is trying to re-establish a sphere of influence to ensure that Russia has control over neighbor countries,” he said at the Wilson Center in June.

The CMC, while morally driven, has inadvertently weakened NATO, and arguing for a limitation of defensive capabilities despite highlighting the Russia threat to neighboring NATO is contradictory.

The moral inconsistency of Stoltenberg’s role in the CMC and as NATO general secretary is palpable. An organization created to avoid war through deterrence has abdicated its responsibility to provide the best possible defense. Stoltenberg’s inability to reconcile these opposing roles has left NATO in a precarious position, with some member states, like Lithuania, taking independent action to withdraw from the CMC and bolster their defenses.

Putin says Russia has ‘sufficient stockpile’ of cluster bombs

Lithuania’s recent decision to withdraw from the CMC with a decisive parliamentary vote highlights the growing divide within NATO. Eastern European countries, acutely aware of the Russian threat, see the need for cluster munitions as a critical component of their defense strategy. In contrast, Western European nations remain bound by the CMC, creating a rift that undermines NATO’s unity and operational effectiveness. Stoltenberg’s departure and the ascension of Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte to lead the alliance offers a crucial opportunity for new leadership to address this divide and establish a cohesive policy.

So far, Rutte has offered no statements on cluster munitions, but to solve the scattered NATO policy on their use, he should take seriously the opinion of NATO nations on Russia’s border.

The Tactical Importance of Cluster Munitions

The practical application of cluster munitions in Ukraine has demonstrated their strategic value. Turkey’s provision of Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) to Ukraine proved pivotal in the Battle of Bakhmut, showcasing the lethal effectiveness of these weapons in multiple pivotal areas.

Cluster munitions can effectively cover large areas, making them ideal for targeting dispersed or moving troops and vehicles. Their dual-purpose nature allows them to be effective against a variety of targets, from light armor to personnel.

The United States approving cluster munitions transfers to Ukraine further underscores their necessity in modern warfare. The delay in providing these munitions due to political debates rooted in the CMC has cost lives and weakened Ukraine’s defense.

NATO members withdrawing from the CMC would not only unify the alliance’s stance but also send a clear signal to Russia regarding NATO’s resolve. The recent support for cluster munitions by Eastern European nations and the practical success observed in Ukraine provides a compelling case for this strategic shift.

Additionally, NATO must take a stand on cluster munitions as an organization, rather than Stoltenberg calling for “governments to decide, and not NATO as an alliance.” The mark of a great leader is the willingness to change positions at inflection points. The defense of Europe requires cluster munitions now, and in the future. This is not 2008.

The Role of China in the Geopolitical Landscape

Moreover, the evolving geopolitical landscape demands that NATO consider the broader implications of its defense strategies, particularly concerning China’s increasing relevance.

China’s strategic partnership with Russia, often described as a “friendship without limits,” has significant implications for NATO. This partnership extends beyond diplomatic support to tangible contributions to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. China has been accused of providing technology and economic aid that indirectly supports Russia’s military operations, thereby complicating the strategic calculations for NATO.

China’s stance on cluster munitions further underscores the need for NATO to reassess its position. China has refused to join the CMC, prioritizing its military capabilities over humanitarian concerns. This refusal allows China to maintain a robust arsenal that includes cluster munitions, which could potentially be used in future conflicts.

NATO must recognize that adhering to the CMC puts it at a strategic disadvantage not only against Russia but also against a rising China.

John Nagl is professor of Warfighting Studies at the U.S. Army War College.

Dan Rice is president of the American University of Kyiv and the co-president of Thayer Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

John and Dan are both Iraq War combat veterans. This article expresses their views and not those of the United States Army, the Army War College or the Department of Defense. The authors would like to thank Army War College senior intern David Heiner of the University of Denver for his help in the research and editing of this article.

This was followed by the attack by Hamas on an Israeli music and arts festival in October 2023 and the subsequent response by Israel in the Gaza Strip — and so far only minor skirmishes in the region between other players.

And with the Chinese government increasing its military budget by an estimated 6% to $296 billion in 2023, spending by Japan and Taiwan each grew 11%.

The result of these actions has hardened the resolve of nations and brought security front and center to political discussions. In 2023, government spending on defense increased to a record $2.443 trillion for the procurement of military equipment and supplies to combat threats; to support allies; and to bolster border security.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute think tank, this is the ninth consecutive year of increases, with last year’s gain of 6.8% the highest level ever recorded.

These resources have funneled through to the global corporations that build, maintain, support and sell the weaponry and supplies. In the U.S. alone, defense spending grew from $721.5 billion in fiscal 2020 (before President Joe Biden took office) to a proposed fiscal 2025 national defense budget of about $926.8 billion; a 28.5% increase.

Defense News’ Top 100 list contains 68 publicly traded companies — or at least their parent organizations — that represent about 73% of the list’s total FY23 defense revenues of $603.9 billion. Exclude China’s presence on the list, and the percentage increases to 89%.

The Top 100 is here: Find out how defense companies performed in FY23

As one would anticipate, the world’s publicly traded defense stocks have seen their price per share rise higher, producing steady gains over the prior two years. Right or wrong, stock prices are a proxy for the health of the defense sector and of investor confidence.

Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, defense stocks have risen by 48%, as defined by the SPADE Defense Index. Assets invested in the sector’s exchange-traded funds are up 268% and now total more than $11 billion, including Invesco’s exchange-traded fund, which has quadrupled its assets during this time.

At the firms themselves, recent quarterly reports from many defense companies, both large and small, show backlogs at historic highs.

Results for the first quarter of 2024 by RTX ($202 billion), Lockheed Martin ($159 billion) and others saw these firms post truly astonishing numbers.

Even Boeing, despite its recent issues with its commercial aircraft and cost overruns on some military programs, maintains a backlog of $529 billion — more than six times its total revenue in FY23.

Ramping up the production volume of an older system is more profitable than the margins for developing new technologies and systems, so defense firms should see a direct translation from reducing their backlogs to increased bottom-line profits.

“The math is simple,” according to Mike Stone, a reporter at Reuters. “For example, to meet demand for missile defenses, production of Patriot interceptors for the U.S. Army — a projectile fired at an incoming missile with the aim of knocking it down — will rise from 550 to 650 rockets per year. At around $4 million each, that’s a potential $400 million annual sales boost on one weapons system alone.”

While sporadic supply chain disruptions and issues related to hiring additional staff remain, firms are working to increase production capacity for the weapons systems and equipment required to supply Ukraine’s war effort, support Israel and restock national assets.

Through June 30, 2024, the SPADE Defense Index had gained 11.5% on the year, keeping it near historic highs. Such performance is not atypical. Over the past 27 years, the sector produced positive gains in 22 of them and outperformed the U.S. stock market in 18.

From an investment perspective, while a conclusion or resolution to hostilities in the various ongoing military theaters would likely lead to some investor pullback as a short-term reaction, defense firms should likely see strong support in the coming years as backlogs are reduced, and as potential hot spots in Asia, Oceania, Europe and the Middle East remain active.

For example, Hezbollah — the Iran-backed militant and political organization operating out of Lebanon and considered a terrorist group by the United States and the United Kingdom — is one of the most heavily armed nonstate groups in the world, with an estimated capability that is 10 times that of the militant group Hamas, based in the Gaza Strip.

An all-out war between Hezbollah and Israel would be devastating to both sides and to Lebanon as a whole.

And while current actions are carefully calculated to avoid a major escalation, with near daily exchanges of fire along the border, it only takes a single stray rocket causing mass casualties to see things get out of control, fueling yet another leg of market gains.

Yet, despite this growth and the importance of firms operating in the defense sector to maintain national security and stability, it should be noted that the valuation of firms operating in this space remains notably small.

Case in point: The combined FY23 revenues of Apple, Alphabet and Microsoft are 49.5% greater than the cumulative defense revenues of those found on the Top 100 list.

Likewise, 16 firms individually have a market valuation greater than the five highest-ranking U.S. defense prime contractors — RTX, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Boeing and Northrop Grumman — combined. (Those 16 firms, as of press time, are Apple, Nvidia, Microsoft, Alphabet, Aramco, Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., Meta, Novo Nordisk, Broadcom, Tesla, Eli Lilly, Visa, Walmart and JPMorgan Chase.)

From an economic standpoint, the defense sector is not large and has plenty of room to grow.

Still, for investors, a portfolio of defense sector stocks has shown to be a solid investment in both good times as well as troubled ones. In the coming quarters and years, as firms work through their contract backlogs and shift to new and ongoing threats, the sector remains poised for continued growth.

Scott Sacknoff manages the SPADE Defense Index, a modified capitalization-weighted index made up of companies operating in the defense, homeland security and government space sectors.

For years now, and with added urgency since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the DOD has been trying to expand access to a wider array of suppliers in pursuit of greater capacity, cost competition and technical innovation. The 2024 National Defense Industrial Strategy stated the DOD’s aim is to “accelerate the growth of a more diverse, dynamic, and resilient modern defense industrial ecosystem.”

Despite the DOD’s efforts to attract new suppliers and diversify the industrial base, results are barely noticeable in the data. The top 11 companies by fiscal 2023 defense revenue in the list are the same as they were in fiscal 2015 (excluding Chinese and Russian firms, and accounting for the RTX and L3Harris Technologies mergers).

Big dogs

These 11 firms have maintained a roughly 60% share of the total defense revenues of all non-Russian or Chinese companies on the Top 100 list each year, from FY15 to FY23 — a group that has grown less diverse through the RTX and L3Harris mergers.

The Top 100 is here: Find out how defense companies performed in FY23

Defense Department contract data mirrors this trend. The top nine companies in FY23 by defense contract obligations are the same as they were for FY15 (accounting for the RTX and L3Harris mergers). During that period, those nine companies accounted for roughly 40% of the cumulative U.S. defense contract value each year, barring the COVID-19 pandemic-related blip during the FY21-22 time frame. Only three other companies cracked the top nine during the intervening years, and two of these were Pfizer and Moderna, due to coronavirus-related spending.

Clearly, the commanding heights are occupied by a core group of highly competitive and entrenched players. But even expanding to look at the top 50 awardees of U.S. defense contract value shows a similar lack of change. The top 50 firms in FY15 have continuously accounted for an average of 58% of all spending each year through FY23.

Some new firms are gaining traction in the DOD market. For example, the selection of Anduril and General Atomics for the first increment of the collaborative combat aircraft program seems to indicate the DOD’s willingness to draw on relative newcomers, even in high-end areas normally the preserve of the primes.

But these players represent just a fraction of DOD spending. Anduril and General Atomics are privately held and do not publicly release financial information. Using DOD contract value data, General Atomics ($2.245 billion in FY23) ranks in the top 50, and Anduril ($240 million in FY23) is not among the top 100 for that fiscal year.

Defense acquisition spending is dominated by major platform and weapon systems contracts, and these deals continue to be led by a select group of top prime contractors. Roughly 70% of the FY25 procurement budget is for aviation, shipbuilding, ground vehicles, missile defense and missiles and munitions — areas that mainly consist of large programs of record.

The real impact of the DOD’s ongoing efforts is among smaller firms than can show up on Defense News’ Top 100 list. The DOD has expanded the channels through which new players can engage the department. The seemingly limitless array of venture capital-funded startups is evidence that firms think the DOD is worth the risk, even if the process is difficult.

But the number of newcomer firms that have grown to a substantial size through serving the DOD remains small — such as General Atomics, SpaceX, Palantir and, perhaps soon, Anduril — and they are exceptions to a much broader trend.

Going global

Indeed, the greatest activity in the Top 100 list has been outside the United States. This is due to both rising defense demand around the world and the increasingly competitive nature of global suppliers.

In the Top 100′s FY15 data, U.S. firms accounted for nearly 60% of the $356.7 billion in defense-related revenue. In this year’s list, for FY23, U.S. firms account for just 54% of the $603.9 billion in defense-related revenue.

What’s more, South Korea’s Hanwha shot from 38th place in FY15 to 19th in this year’s list. Likewise, German company Rheinmetall was 27th, but buoyed by Ukraine-related demand, the firm is now 20th. Israel’s Elbit Systems went from 26th to 22nd.

The latest list also includes additions that did not appear in last year’s version based in China, Germany, Turkey, South Korea, India, the U.K. and the U.S.

For China, domestic firms once again started appearing on the Top 100 list for FY18. The most recent time before that when a Chinese business appeared in the rankings was for fiscal 1999. From FY18 to FY23, Chinese firms’ share of the Top 100 defense revenue has hovered at an average of 18%.

Growth among major international companies is another reason it is unlikely that smaller U.S. suppliers will appear on the Top 100 list. However, the limited change to the makeup of the list belies the increased engagement of the DOD, with new suppliers beneath the surface.

Doug Berenson is a partner in the aerospace and defense practice at the consultancy Oliver Wyman, where Ian van Son is an associate.

On the other side of the coin — or the border — North Korea’s defense industry also has a new major customer: Russia.

A recent visit to Pyongyang by Russian leader Vladimir Putin attracted the world’s attention. Russia needs North Korean ammunition, while North Korea needs to send its labor force to Russia to gather information about defense technologies like intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and satellites.

In North Korea, about 500,000 workers and 300 defense industry factories exist in the Second Economy Commission, which oversees nearly all aspects of materiel production and sales. Most factories are located in the North and South Pyongan provinces, the North and South Hamgyong provinces, the Chagang province and the Kangwon province.

The defense sector makes up about 30% to 60% of North Korea’s total economy, or approximately $10 billion. About $700 million goes to nuclear development, and about $600 million goes to missile development.

The Top 100 is here: Find out how defense companies performed in FY23

Recently, North Korean media openly showed Kim Jong Un’s visit to defense industry factories.

Usually, the nation’s media does not report on defense industry facilities as such, describing them as ordinary factories. But the transparency this time represents how important Kim considers the sector.

Since 2022, Rodong Sinmun has run at least eight articles discussing 18 visits to defense industry factories. The openness and timing is significant, given Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine that year.

During this period, Kim has emphasized a desire to prepare for war and modernize the domestic industry’s weapons production processes.

This year, North Korea began reorganizing entities under the Second Economic Commission in order to achieve Kim’s directives. He appointed a new chairman of the Second Economic Commission, and has dropped mentions of tests for the country’s 240mm multiple rocket launcher as well as construction efforts to support the weapon’s production.

Kim’s recent interactions with Putin and his emphasis on North Korea’s defense industry amid the war has a clear strategic purpose.

For one, these moves are meant to serve as a response to security cooperation between the United States, South Korea and Japan.

Secondly, North Korea has benefited from providing arms to Russia during the war. Decades ago, during the Korean War, the Soviet Union supported the creation of the Korean People’s Army, and the Soviet Army was a role model for the North.

Now, North Korea is able to support Russia by sending ammunition and other conventional weapons. The partnership provides opportunities for North Korea’s labor force to travel to Russia to learn about advanced defense technologies.

North Korea considers its version of the K-defense industry to be an engine for economic development. From the North’s point of view, Russia is just the beginning, as other potential customers could follow suit.

Indeed, if North Korea accepts an invitation from Russia to join a Russia-China combined military exercise, this would be a great turning point for the government and a game changer to Northeast Asia’s security architecture.

The worst-case scenario would be the North’s export of weapons of mass destruction, including, but not limited to, nuclear war heads.

Kim’s ambition has grown beyond selling access to the Wonsan spa resort. Now, North Korea is seeking its own version of the K-defense industry.

Youngjun Kim is a professor at the Korea National Defense University and a nonresident fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research think tank.

The enduring conflicts in Ukraine, the Levant and Red Sea underscore the tumultuous nature of the global security environment. The United States’ adversaries and challengers are growing increasingly aligned in their efforts to undermine the international order and disrupt global stability. A coercive and aggressive Chinese Communist Party is militarizing at a wartime pace. The U.S. and our European allies face depleted arsenals while tensions in the Middle East continue to boil, increasing concerns that these challenges will require the joint force to make trade-offs between competing defense priorities. Herein lies the central defense challenge of today: ensuring the joint force has the requisite capabilities and capacity — the depth of magazine — to support U.S. allies and partners and sustain a protracted campaign of its own.

Depth matters

The depth of our nation’s magazine extends beyond ammunition storage and weapons. It encompasses our munitions, fuel and food stockpiles, and prepositioned inventories. It also includes the resiliency of our supply chains and the strength and depth of our industrial capacity. Additionally, it requires a deep bench of reserve and rotational forces that can relieve, reinforce and enable rapid reconstitution. Most importantly, it must effectively meet the needs of a short- and long-term time horizon.

While the joint force is postured to meet defense requirements now, the uncertainty of the future operating environment and the unpredictability of our adversaries heighten the risks associated with a shallow magazine. For example, an insufficient supply of aircraft, ammunition or aviators could limit our strike warfare operational tempo in the Indo-Pacific.

In the case of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian leadership failed to plan for the resources required to sustain their formations beyond the opening stages while limited inventories likely constrained the scope of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive. While Ukraine registered an operational demand for 250,000 artillery rounds per month in the lead-up, they were limited to approximately 90,000 artillery rounds per month at the height of the counteroffensive.

Ukraine has recognized it cannot solely rely on allies and partners and is working to expand the capacity of its industrial base. These efforts are proving fruitful, particularly in drone production. The number of domestic drone manufacturers has grown from seven to over 300 within the last eighteen months to keep pace with the Ukrainian armed forces’ consumption of over 10,000 unmanned platforms per month. However, production capacity takes time.

The clear lesson here is that limited capacity could force the U.S. to limit the scope of its military objectives or operational force employment if it is determined that a long-duration, high-tempo campaign is unsustainable. Most importantly, it could undermine the credibility of U.S. deterrence and embolden our adversaries.

The short, sharp illusion

Cathal J. Nolan systematically examines the Second Punic War, the Hundred Years’ War, the War of Spanish Succession, the Napoleonic Wars and the world wars in his 2017 book, “The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost.” He underscores that great power warfare is a society-encompassing affair that uses the full extent of a nation’s industrial capacity and political will. Major wars are most often won by the state with greater long-term capability and capacity.

The myth of the short, sharp conflict does not reflect the historical record, nor does it serve as a prudent planning factor for future conflict. Regardless of theater, joint and coalition forces need a depth of magazine that can last years — not months. China is increasing its weapons inventory five to six times faster than the United States while building multilayered antiaccess, area-denial defenses. Any conflict with China would produce an insatiable appetite for resources.

Not easy work

During the recent NATO summit in Washington, D.C., NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted the alliance has failed to keep up with the demands of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Whether hampered by policy, politics or production capacity, NATO is not matching Russia’s renewed wartime production. Building and maintaining a depth of magazine requires proactive decision-making.

Closer coordination and teaming between government, defense and commercial industry will be required to meaningfully accelerate and scale critical capabilities in areas where industry is clearly in the lead. The U.S. should pursue procurement solutions and block buys of exquisite weapons, platforms and munitions while leveraging allies’ and partners’ ability to manufacture high quantities of defense commodities to focus on the capabilities that will be needed in a future high-end, high-intensity conflict. Ultimately, depth of magazine, along with a strategy to win beyond the opening stages of a conflict, should be carefully planned for and initiated well prior to the onset of conflict. That time is now.

Mars must be fed

History tells us that great power conflict comes with a high likelihood of protraction. If the U.S. is to maintain a credible deterrent and prevent the outbreak of a protracted war, the U.S. and its allies and partners must have deep enough magazines to sustain military operations in a long, high-intensity conflict. An insufficient inventory risks limiting the operational tempo and scope of military objectives or undermining our ability to sustain a protracted conflict. Ultimately, the depth of our magazine will determine the credibility of U.S. deterrence and our ability to protect national security.

Gen. Christopher Mahoney is the assistant commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.

In contemporary military operations, UAS are being tightly integrated into infantry tactics, used in new and creative ways for reconnaissance, leveraged for forward operating base defense, relied on to provide critical intelligence and deployed for data collection. Because UAS can autonomously operate in hazardous environments and undertake high-risk missions, they have revolutionized warfare by significantly enhancing operational safety and expanding tactical options for ground forces.

In response to China’s historical technological dominance in the UAS market and amid the technology’s rapid evolution, Congress has taken steps to foster technology development while addressing new potential dangers. Legislative measures have been introduced to support the development of domestic UAS capabilities.

H.R. 2864, the C-CCP Drone Act, would mandate the inclusion of equipment produced by Shenzhen Da-Jiang Innovations Sciences and Technologies Company Limited (DJI Technologies), the world’s largest drone manufacturer, on the Federal Communications Commission’s list of equipment that poses a risk to U.S. national security.

The threat of Chinese advancements

DJI and Autel, both Chinese companies, control more than 90% of the global drone market. In the mid to late 2000s, subsidized pricing allowed DJI to penetrate global markets rapidly, including within the U.S. and NATO countries, to the detriment of domestic manufacturers.

The ubiquity and cost advantages of Chinese drones have disrupted foreign markets while introducing security vulnerabilities in sensitive areas such as critical infrastructure, military bases and urban surveillance. Reports have surfaced of data from Chinese-made drones being transmitted back to servers in China, raising concerns about espionage and data security. China’s collaboration with Russia to enhance Russian FPV drone production capabilities could also pose a further challenge to the U.S. and NATO.

US countermeasures and investment

In this environment, ensuring the West’s UAS superiority on the battlefield will depend on the success of efforts to bolster domestic capabilities, increase investments in R&D and develop advanced technologies that can compete with and surpass those produced by China.

The Department of Defense has initiated multiple programs to bolster U.S.-based UAS manufacturers and support the development of a secure and reliable supply chain for critical components.

Meanwhile, private companies like Anduril, Shield AI and Edge Autonomy are leading the charge with new UAS solutions tailored for defense applications. These innovators are not only developing cutting-edge technology but also ensuring their products are free from foreign influence and data security dangers by manufacturing critical components such as cameras, gimbals, flight controllers, and radios onshore.

Private equity can further these efforts by strategically investing in innovative companies and technologies, driving the growth of domestic UAS innovation. Moreover, by supporting these companies’ efforts to develop onshore manufacturing processes and establish secure supply chains, private equity investment can help reduce dependence on foreign sources and enhance national security.

It is therefore paramount to invest in developing and deploying critical technologies and cyber tools to the warfighter that will be necessary to accelerate domestic UAS development and deployment.

Doctrine, training and safety standards

While much is happening on the production front, we also need to consider the impact of UAS on military operations, which will require significant adjustments. Military doctrine will need to continue to evolve to include new tactics, techniques and procedures for UAS-supported fire and maneuver. Following special operations’ lead in this domain, new protocols will have to be rapidly transitioned to the conventional forces.

Training programs must also change to focus on the operational skills required to manage UAS fleets, interpret real-time data and integrate UAS intelligence into broader operational contexts. This training should include ethical considerations related to privacy violations and rules of engagement in settings where civilian populations are often at risk.

Outlook

Innovations in artificial intelligence, machine learning and autonomous operations are certain to further enhance UAS capabilities, making them more efficient and versatile. AI is poised to play a significant role in the future of UAS by enabling drones to perform complex tasks with minimal human intervention and adapt to dynamic combat environments, improving their ability to detect and respond to threats. Autonomous operations will reduce the burden on human operators, allowing for more efficient and effective mission execution.

Soon, we can also expect to see UAS with extended operational ranges, improved stealth features and advanced payload capabilities. Integrating UAS with other emerging technologies such as augmented reality and cyber warfare tools will also create new tactical opportunities and challenges.

The integration of UAS with AI will also give ground troops enhanced situational awareness, as well as better coordination and decision-making in the field. Likewise, cyber warfare tools will enable UAS to disrupt enemy communications and infrastructure, providing a strategic advantage in modern conflicts.

As UAS technology continues to evolve and domestic drone production expands, it is crucial for military and industry leaders to closely monitor threats while fostering an entrepreneurial environment that prioritizes continuous innovation, rigorous training and doctrinal adaptation. Through collaboration, the potential of UAS can be fully realized, ensuring that military operations are as effective and efficient as possible while minimizing risks to combatants and civilians.

Florent Groberg is a vice president at AE Industrial within the firm’s Portfolio Strategy and Optimization Group. Groberg previously held key positions at Microsoft, Boeing and LinkedIn. Prior to that, Groberg was a captain in the U.S. Army, completing both U.S. Army Airborne and U.S. Army Ranger schools. Groberg received the Medal of Honor for his actions in combat operations in Afghanistan in 2012. He currently serves on the American Battle Monuments Commission, an appointment by the president of the United States.

These systems bring with them the prospect of new technologies, new operational designs and, potentially, new business models. A key question for the Navy is how to signal to industry that the service has a thoughtful plan for the vast private sector investments needed to enable this transition, not to stifle innovation, but to avoid a feeding frenzy that the Navy cannot channel to best effect. One of the clearest needs for guardrails comes with how the Navy will execute command and control (C2) over the data, platforms, and networks that will underpin an ever larger and more lethal robotic fleet. As industry sees dollar signs at the dawn of robotic warfare, the Navy must consider whether it wants C2 to become a commercial offering before it finds itself having done so by accident. It may well be on that path already.

Three examples, from the sea to space, illustrate the Navy’s experimentation with partially privatized command and control, with attendant benefits and risks. Furthest downstream, Saildrone has taken a pole position in waterfront experimentation at FIFTH and FOURTH fleets in part because of a contractor-owned, contractor-operated model that enabled quicker and cheaper iteration. What the company’s website calls “mission-as-a-service” is effectively maritime domain awareness (MDA) for sale — the Navy buys the data stream coming off a vessel while the business operates the platform itself. This model has been invaluable as a route to fast testing on the water, though it has limitations, not least given companies’ likely opposition to sending company-owned vessels into high threat environments (e.g., the Red Sea or Black Sea today, maybe the South China Sea tomorrow). MDA for sale has helped the Navy move at speed, but it is unlikely to serve as an enduring model to achieve scale considering the Service is in the business of putting expensive platforms in harms way.

Midstream, Andruil offers an example of where some of the greatest potential uncaptured value is in the unfurling realm of mass distribution of robotic platforms at sea. As any Silicon Valley firm will tell you, selling hardware is good, but selling the digital rails on which those systems operate is better. Andruil’s Lattice architecture is one such example of an attempt to own the rails, or at least some of them. Advertised as “sensor, network, and system agnostic,” Lattice is an aspiring common architecture to enable large-scale robotic autonomy, something the Navy will surely need as it deploys hundreds of small systems. As with any software, the question for the Navy will be how much customization it can access, how quickly it can adapt underlying data, and how well it understands the algorithms that will translate commander’s intent into lethal autonomous actions. There is also a natural tension here — the more control industry has over the data, the more value it can extract. The Department of Defense has been here before, as with the debate over proprietary data rights surrounding the F-35.

Furthest upstream, we can see in Starlink another case of commercial value and commercial risks. DoD has announced a military version of the satellite internet service (Starshield) and the Navy is reportedly working with SpaceX on shipboard Starlink terminals. We have seen the potent efficacy of such systems in Ukraine, as well as the potential operational limitations that privatized networks can impose on missions that may jeopardize business (or personal) interests. Starlink is also a good example of a defense application derived from a non-defense service, which enables the Navy and DoD to shoulder less of the development burden. That matters greatly when you consider the relative collapse of defense R&D spending, down from 36% of global research dollars in 1960 to around 3% now. Where the U.S. defense sector was the engine of innovation in the Cold War, it is private industry today, and most often in search of commercial uses. Where the Navy can find common cause with commercial providers, it can ride on the coattails of an R&D enterprise that no longer orbits around the national security apparatus — though at a different kind of cost.

Individually, these efforts are technologically interesting and operationally significant. Collectively, they represent a potentially seismic shift in how the Navy thinks about command and control. This is neither “good” nor “bad.” The question at hand is whether a collective move towards a constellation of commercial C2 services, from deployed data streams to space-based networks, is strategic in design, or whether the Navy is inadvertently backing itself into C2 as a service. Intentionality is the core question, because the only way to manage risks associated with a commercialized C2 model is to know you are heading in that direction.

To date, the scale of naval uncrewed systems employment simply has not forced this conversation, or the associated business opportunities. In the air, the Navy fields MQ-4C Triton for aerial reconnaissance and MQ-8C Fire Scout for surface search and attack, but the numbers are relatively small and never constitute autonomous swarms beyond the span of human control. In other domains, the Navy has experimented for years with a small number of larger systems. On the surface, DARPA-initiated Sea Hunter is the latest in a line of experimental uncrewed surface vessels. It is joined by a modest family of larger uncrewed surface vessels pioneered by OSD’s Strategic Capabilities Office under the moniker of Ghost Fleet Overlord. Undersea, the Orca extra-large undersea vessel is inching towards fielding, and DARPA recently completed testing on a large design called Manta Ray.

What is new, as exemplified by Replicator, is a dash towards fielding thousands of smaller systems as a hedge against China and (ideally) as a bridge while the Navy pivots towards a more distributed and sustainable hybrid fleet design. As a result, the question of who owns C2 will only become more pressing. For industry, C2 as a service is novel, operationally valuable in the near-term, and theoretically lucrative in the long-term. For the Navy, the near-term attraction of outsourcing sensing, maneuvering, and networking to field more uncrewed systems faster must be balanced by the risks of entrenching a privatized C2 structure in an increasingly lethal architecture without a bigger plan. C2 as a service has some novel attributes, but it is not without its perils.

Joshua Tallis is a Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses and the author of The War for Muddy Waters. From 2021-2023 he was the CNA advisor to the Sixth Fleet commander. His views are his own and do not represent those of CNA or the U.S. Navy.

Exactly how this modernization should take place will be the subject of future discussions. But one thing is already clear: Such politico-military debates require above all subject-matter expertise – or, as it is known in NATO, a sufficient nuclear IQ. This applies not only to political decision makers but also to the need of creating an informed public.

Germany’s nuclear IQ is currently in a poor state. The brief public debate in early 2024 on how to respond to Donald Trump’s announcements that, as U.S. president, he would question the American promise to protect its allies, revealed a profound lack of knowledge in large parts of politics, in the press and even among supposed experts. Statements by members of parliament revealed considerable gaps in knowledge, and a well-known German historian seriously suggested in a press interview that the European Union should procure its own nuclear weapons and -- in the absence of EU statehood – rotate the “red button” between the European capitals.

So much ignorance is frightening, but it can be found in many non-nuclear NATO states. The widespread narrative since the 1990s, particularly in Western Europe, of being “surrounded by friends” has caused general interest in security and defence policy to wane. Nuclear issues were frowned upon and were only discussed, if at all, in small circles of experts. “Peace research” was often misunderstood as a substitute for strategic thinking and nuclear weapons were seen almost exclusively as objects of nuclear disarmament.

To reverse this trend and to provide Germany with the nuclear expertise necessary to pursue its interests in a new security environment, a nuclear “Zeitenwende” will be necessary. This will require adaptations in universities, in the armed forces, in think tanks and in the wide field of civil education.

Generating security policy expertise for politics, journalism or the public begins at universities. Currently, the number of professors who offer seminars on deterrence or nuclear issues in their political seminars in Germany is almost negligible. Changing this will not only require government funding for security policy and strategy professorships. It would also necessitate efforts to counter the stigmatisation of security policy within the German educational system, where the few professors who deal with nuclear strategy issues still face rejection and protest both within and outside their institutions.

Also, the German armed forces and the Ministry of Defence have long ignored the relevance of nuclear deterrence. In last two decades, the General Staff College of the Bundeswehr taught nuclear deterrence only as a side issue and in the German MoD only two (!) of the approximately 2,500 employees deal explicitly with nuclear issues. It is obvious that with these limited capacities, it is difficult to meet NATO’s requirements for independent nuclear positions, particularly as Germany is a country where American nuclear weapons are stationed.

The same holds true for the German think tank landscape. Of the roughly 30 foreign and security policy think tanks, only one or two deal with nuclear issues on a permanent and structured basis. Changing this overnight is difficult, as the number of academic experts in the field is still scarce. Moreover, since – unlike in the United States – there is little exchange of personnel between ministries and foreign and security policy research institutes, the relationship between the two worlds is not always free of tension. Ministries often complain that the think tanks do not provide the analyses required for day-to-day work, while think tank representatives often complain that political decision makers are resistant to advice. This could be remedied by offering more think tankers to spend a few months in a ministry to learn what form of policy advice is required in ministerial bureaucracies.

Finally, Germany has a vast number of political education institutions – often state-funded – that address both political decision makers and the public. Those which focus on security policy should be requested to include questions on nuclear deterrence more strongly in their educational programs.

However, when addressing nuclear strategy issues in politics and society, it is important that knowledge transfer is not misunderstood as nuclear indoctrination, but that the strengths and weaknesses of a security policy based on deterrence are openly identified. Nuclear deterrence is a partly contradictory concept that raises painful political or ethical questions. Addressing these openly and self-critically, even when conclusive and universally satisfactory answers cannot be found, is also part of the nuclear IQ.

Karl-Heinz Kamp was a Special Advisor in the German Ministry of Defence and is an Associate Fellow of the German Council on Foreign Relations

Germany first announced a special fund of €100 billion (U.S. $108 billion) to provide its armed forces, the Bundeswehr, with additional procurement and training funding through 2027, along with a promise to maintain defense spending above the 2% minimum that NATO encourages its members to reach. It’s the second-largest national contributor of military aid to Ukraine after the United States.

Now Germany is establishing a permanent military presence in Lithuania, which is along NATO’s eastern flank. In April, about two dozen German soldiers arrived in Lithuania, marking the first time since World War II that German forces will be based outside the country for a long-term basis. The deployment is expected to be at full strength by 2027, totaling 4,800 soldiers.

Germany also plans by 2027 to order 105 Leopard 2 A8 tanks, some of which will be delivered to augment the German brigade in Lithuania, which will be designated as Panzerbrigade 45. This German base in Lithuania will resemble American overseas bases in Germany, with families being stationed alongside service members, and housing and amenities available on base.

Additional NATO forces are especially necessary in Lithuania, which sits between Russian-allied Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Formed in 1945 from Germany’s East Prussia, Kaliningrad was ceded to the Soviet Union as part of the Potsdam Agreement. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kaliningrad remained part of the Russian Federation, but now finds itself separated from the rest of Russia by the three Baltic states and by Belarus. Kaliningrad hosts Russia’s Baltic Fleet, along with thousands of Russian troops, fighter jets and nuclear-capable Iskander missiles.

The small corridor between Lithuania and Belarus is known as the Suwalki Gap — widely identified as the weakest point in NATO. If Russian forces were ever to attempt an attack on the three Baltic states, they could both link Belarus and Kaliningrad to cut off supplies from Poland to the Baltic states via an attack on the Suwalki Gap.

This means that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are the NATO member states with the most pressing need for additional assets capable of deterring Russia.

Estonia and Latvia deserve similar assurances. Both host rotational forces, but a permanent base from other NATO members in each would offer a far firmer and more permanent security guarantee from the rest of the alliance.

The United States needs to focus its scarce resources on the Indo-Pacific region, where it faces the daunting challenge posed by China. The need for permanent basing in Estonia and Latvia — approved and coordinated with the host nations, of course — should be filled by European NATO members willing to step up and follow the example Germany has set in Lithuania.

Americans should applaud, encourage and assist European NATO states in taking steps to increase their contributions to conventional deterrence in Europe, enabling as it does the pivot of U.S. resources to the Indo-Pacific.

Wilson Beaver is a policy advisor for defense budgeting in The Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for National Security. Elizabeth Lapporte is a member of the think tank’s Young Leaders Program.

Alliance members will also discuss the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. In addition, they will need to discuss supply chain management and defense acquisition. These two topics will be crucial during this year’s gathering.

During the 2023 NATO Summit, members reaffirmed their commitment to helping defend Ukraine. The alliance established the NATO-Ukraine Council, a “joint body where Allies and Ukraine sit as equal participants to advance political dialogue, engagement, cooperation and Ukraine’s aspirations for membership in NATO.” NATO members also ruled to remove a membership action plan as a requirement for Ukrainian membership. Despite this progress, the alliance opted not to present an official invitation to the Ukrainians.

In the defense acquisition space, the alliance discussed formidable military capabilities. Several members also committed to increasing their defense spending, and they debated supplying Ukraine with various forms of military equipment. The discussions were viewed as a major victory for the alliance, and many experts predicted there would be a significant change.

What transpired, however, was much different. Nearly a year after the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, several Western media outlets have reported Russia has made gains in eastern Ukraine. In addition, it was stated that the Russian Federation was producing “nearly three times” more artillery munitions than the U.S. and Europe. Russia has also increased its defense capabilities by purchasing defense equipment from North Korea and Iran. This has allowed the Russians to arm themselves and continue their invasion of Ukraine.

Finland and Sweden in NATO are strategic assets, not liabilities

Meanwhile, as the Russians made their gains in the east, the European Union and the United States delayed additional aid to Ukraine. In Europe, a new assistance package was initially proposed in June 2023. This included financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.

The package, however, was stalled, as EU members disagreed on the total cost of the assistance, its impact and its distribution. (The majority of EU members are also members of NATO.) After several months of debating, the assistance package was finally passed in February 2024. In other words, aid to Ukraine from the EU was delayed for eight months.

Similarly, in the United States, a new defense and humanitarian aid package for Ukraine was proposed in October 2023. Elected officials in the House of Representatives and the Senate argued the need for the aid, and they constantly revised the legislation. After several deliberations and delays, the new U.S. assistance package was finally passed in April 2024, nearly seven months after it was initially presented.

While the legislative bodies in the EU and the U.S. delayed assistance to Ukraine, several reports stated that the Ukrainians were running out of ammunition. During the autumn and winter of 2023 to 2024, the Ukrainians needed to reprioritize and strategize their efforts to minimize casualties while protecting their citizens. The Ukrainians lost some territory to Russia in the east.

Given these developments over the past year, NATO members must work more closely and thoughtfully with the Ukrainians to ensure they are victorious in their efforts against the Russians. Addressing the defense acquisition space will be an essential place to start. NATO members should consider addressing at least three areas.

First, NATO should encourage technology sharing to enhance interoperability between member countries. Information sharing “reduces duplication, enables pooling of resources and produces synergies among all Allies.” It would allow NATO members to manufacture equipment more efficiently and effectively, and it would limit manufacturing setbacks.

In addition, it would lessen the burden on defense industries in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and force other NATO members to pull their weight in the defense-industrial space. This would also enhance their collective national security.

Once information sharing has been identified, NATO members could expand their defense industries using these new technical abilities. Outdated manufacturing plants in the United States and Europe could be refurbished to create new equipment. This would allow Western countries to develop equipment and hardware more quickly, supplying Ukraine with the necessary tools to win the war.

Manufacturing these materials would also help NATO replenish its stockpiles while it supplies the Ukrainians with weapons. In addition, using these factories would create new employment opportunities for Americans and Europeans, leading to job growth. This would help boost Western economies.

Finally, producing more equipment more efficiently and rapidly would help address delays in providing defense assistance to Ukraine. A surplus in production would increase the equipment and hardware NATO members have available. These countries can then send this hardware to the Ukrainians more easily, as the equipment will be available.

In addition, rather than creating equipment from scratch, some Western countries have refurbished older defense equipment, thus reducing the delay on goods.

In short, enhancing NATO’s defense acquisition sector will take time. It will not be easy, and it will require all 32 NATO members to cooperate and collaborate to ensure supply chain issues are addressed, manufacturing is increased, and aid to Ukraine is provided more efficiently and effectively. Providing Ukraine with the tools it needs will help it defend itself against the ongoing Russian invasion and take back its territory.

Additional delays in aiding Ukraine, however, will allow the Russians to bolster their defenses. It will give the Russians additional time to increase their weapons production, purchase equipment from North Korea and Iran, and continue waging its war against Ukraine. This would result in further destruction and devastation across Ukraine. It will also lead to the additional loss of life.

Therefore, if NATO is serious about helping Ukraine win the war against Russia, then it must address these previous munition shortcomings and enhance defense procurement. Otherwise, should there be future delays, then this could see the Russian invasion of Ukraine quickly turn into a forever war. No one will want this.

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council think tank’s Eurasia Center.

Advocates for Secure Enclave argued that Trusted Foundry, a program in existence since 2004 where Defense Department inspectors certify commercial semiconductor sector manufacturing facilities, was not secure enough for some types of chips, including state-of-the-art ones. Nevertheless, the reaction to this budget allocation legerdemain has been widespread disapproval.

“I don’t know how this happened, but it should not have,” said Charles Wessner, an expert on global innovation policy at the Center for Strategic International Studies think tank.

“There should be no Secure Enclave in the CHIPS program,” said Rep. Zoe Lofgren, D-Calif., the ranking member of the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee, “and any secure program that might be necessary should be funded by the Department of Defense … not from CHIPS funding that should be focused on revitalizing our domestic chip capacity.”

Is this simply a bureaucratic schoolyard fight where the Defense Department steals some of the Commerce Department’s lunch money?

While it is impossible to fairly evaluate the merits of both what has been done and how it has been done without access to the classified briefings, some semiconductor industry and national security program context helps explain what exactly is going on.

Semiconductors are more valuable and critical today than oil during the industrial age. Natural gas, coal, wind, solar, geothermal and nuclear power are all alternative energy sources that in some instances can replace the power supplied by oil. In addition, multiple countries on different continents have large sources of oil. Neither of these two key factors apply to semiconductors. There are no alternatives to semiconductors, and as a practical matter there is no real alternative to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. in Taiwan.

TSMC now manufactures approximately 90% of all advanced semiconductors in the world. When Russia invaded Ukraine, and Western countries heavily sanctioned Moscow’s oil and gas industry, Western countries had the ability — albeit in some cases with great difficulty — to turn to alternative producers of oil and gas as well as alternative sources of energy. If China attacks or blockades Taiwan, it is currently impossible for the lost volume of TSMC’s advanced semiconductors to be made up elsewhere. TINA, an investment and political acronym for “there is no alternative,” now has a place in the national security discourse.

Adm. Phil Davidson, then-chief of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, predicted China will attempt an attack on Taiwan by 2027. What is now known as the Davidson window provides additional context for Secure Enclave. Intel recently purchased from the semiconductor specialist ASML a high numerical aperture extreme ultraviolet wavelength semiconductor manufacturing system — its most advanced system. Intel expects that it will begin early production of some of the world’s most advanced computer chips from this system in the 2026-2027 time frame.

Congress’ notoriously erratic defense budget approval process means if Secure Enclave had not been funded by the CHIPS Act program, there likely would be no operational Secure Enclave until after the Davidson window had closed.

There is, though, another piece to this national security semiconductor puzzle: Trusted Foundry. A little-known agency within the Defense Department, the Defense Microelectronics Activity is the accrediting authority for the Trusted Foundry program, which ensures semiconductor components incorporated into military systems have not been compromised by foreign agents.

Several key weaknesses in the Trusted Foundry program provide context for why there may have been no desire to have this new secure advanced semiconductor manufacturing program simply folded into it.

Until Intel’s new extreme ultraviolet wavelength tool comes online in the Secure Enclave, the Defense Department can only buy chips from the trusted foundries, which are two generations behind what is available on the commercial state-of-the-art market. Part of the problem is that the Defense Department is not a large purchaser of microelectronics, so many semiconductor companies are unable to make a business case for participating in the Trusted Foundry program.

Insider threats are also a significant problem with this program, according to Mark Lewis, former acting deputy undersecretary of defense for research and engineering and former director of defense research and engineering for modernization. “We’ve seen a number of examples where the biggest threats that we face often are the insider threat. It’s the people inside the fence line, behind the guards, who we think we’ve cleared,” he said. “They’re the ones that pose the biggest threats to us.”

In light of these problems, the Trusted Foundry program has been deemed a failure and was supposed to be phased out, but that never happened. Defense Microelectronics Activity continued to run the Trusted Foundry program in a business-as-usual mode, with no announcement regarding its closure, no winding down of existing contracts, and no website notice of the Trusted Foundry program’s demise.

Instead, Defense Microelectronics Activity has focused on the next iteration of the Trusted Foundry program, which it calls the Trusted Foundry Access III program, by awarding contracts in 2023 “to ensure uninterrupted access to measurably secure, State-of-the-Art semiconductor foundry services over a 10-year period of performance.”

Pilfering funding from another department for one’s own is as old as bureaucracy itself. The semiconductor industry, national security and domestic political contexts to this particular interdepartmental commerce and defense bureaucratic wrangling indicate the national security stakes could not be higher.

André Brunel is an international technology attorney with Reiter, Brunel and Dunn. This commentary was adapted from his article published in the Journal of Business & Technology Law. The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are his and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the law firm or any clients it represents.

Mission requirements and cyber threats change quickly. Staying current requires agile development practices that continuously integrate and deliver high-quality software with reduced risk. Security authorizations should be equally nimble, but repeatedly seeking an Authority to Operate, or ATO, is notoriously time-consuming. Waiting for an ATO and working through assessments is often the longest step in deploying software. These delays can have significant consequences, especially on the battlefield.

There are better ways to manage the risk of information systems. DoD officials recently released the DevSecOps Continuous Authorization Implementation Guide, which maps out the principles of the continuous Authority to Operate, or cATO, model. After a system achieves its initial authorization, properly implementing cATO a la ongoing authorization is a fundamental step in the department’s vision to build a faster, more secure development environment and achieve software supremacy.

What is cATO?

Getting a traditional ATO requires a point-in-time check of security controls that can drag on for months. The exercise repeats when new features roll out or the authorization expires. Meanwhile, cyber adversaries continue to unveil novel threats.

cATO is an ongoing authorization for continuous delivery after achieving the initial authorization. It allows an organization to build and release new system capabilities if it can continuously monitor them against the approved security controls. To achieve cATO, DoD identifies three criteria organizations must meet:

— Continuous monitoring of security controls.

— Active cyber defense measures.

— The adoption of DevSecOps practices.

Shifting from periodic reviews to constant monitoring avoids drifting out of compliance and creates a more robust cybersecurity posture. This isn’t just theory; it’s a proven concept. As co-founder of the U.S. Air Force’s Kessel Run, we originally designed cATO as a specified approach to ongoing authorization for continuous delivery, without cutting any corners.

We applied DecSecOps principles to meet the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Risk Management Framework, or RMF, requirements. In April 2018, DoD officials approved cATO for Kessel Run’s systems. The ongoing authorization granted authorization at the time of release and removed it as the bottleneck for lead time and deployment frequency. High performing DevOps organizations employing this approach often achieve lead time and deployment frequency that is measured in hours, which is considered “elite” in The State of DevOps Report.

Preparing teams for ongoing authorization

cATO is not a waiver or a shortcut to compliance with the RMF. Instead, the method tackles requirements at every step of the software development lifecycle to reduce risk. When done correctly, adopting this ongoing authorization strategy is still about authorizing the system, not “authorizing the people and the process” or employing “cATO pipelines.” That said, the inputs that result in secure and authorized outputs for a trustworthy and transparent environment are the right people, processes, and technologies.

To start, leaders must foster a culture of security awareness across the organization by eliminating bureaucratic barriers and recruiting the right technical talent. To shift left on anything, we have to make space for it. For example, cutting low-value work out of developer schedules or removing backlogs gives them time to work on security with their regular tasks.

Programs should have at least one dedicated independent technical assessor for their teams, who work for their Security Controls Assessor and Authorizing Official, to help get the software to production more efficiently. And because security doesn’t happen in a silo, build open lines of communication between security, development, and operations teams to synchronize the latest mission requirements.

Building a security baseline

A critical technical component of continuous authorization is maximizing common control inheritance. The RMF allows applications deployed on top of cloud and platform environments to inherit the underlying controls. Organizations like software factories or service-level programs with thousands of apps can quickly see time and cost savings by architecting for these authorized common controls providers.

The DoD has the opportunity to drive greater efficiency by providing centralized, inheritable security baselines and cloud services for department-wide use, or at a minimum, mission-wide use. Enterprise-wide common controls would enhance the entire department’s cyber posture and support faster software delivery for every service and component.

Building a transparent system

Successful cATO implementations require organizations to deeply understand a system and the cascading effects of any changes to it. Organizations must focus on transparency and traceability, embracing an everything-as-code mindset to ensure controls remain within the approved configurations.

Processes require digitization and, when feasible, automation, including documentation and evidence assessment. The most commonly used governance, risk and compliance platforms weren’t built for ongoing authorizations; systems with the ability to handle modular evidence packages may need to replace antiquated platforms. Give the team’s independent technical assessors access to logs, code repositories, and dashboards to monitor controls and communicate changes to authorizing officials as necessary.

One misconception is that pipelines are a magic wand for cATO. While they are an essential tool, there is much more required for ongoing authorization. A smart way to use pipelines is to incorporate scans that evaluate software against service-level agreements and block it from the production environment if issues remain.

At the end of the day, an organization pursuing cATO must produce a secure system and deliver new capabilities within an acceptable risk profile. Ongoing authorizations are the most effective way for DoD to streamline software delivery and ensure a future where fewer bad things happen because of bad software.

Bryon Kroger is the CEO and founder at Rise8 and co-founder of the U.S. Air Force’s Kessel Run, the Department of Defense’s first software factory, where he pioneered cATO.

Currently, Ukraine has few counters to glide bomb strikes.

As Ukraine gains new Western arms and technologies, it can better address the threat. But the West will also need to show more flexibility in the conditions it sets for Ukraine’s use of advanced weaponry.

Glide bombs are cheap. Russia is firing hundreds a week at Ukrainian targets at and behind the front lines. These bombs are small and difficult to spot on radar. They do not use propulsion or emit a detectable heat signature. Russian aircraft launch glide bombs dozens of miles behind the front lines, in relative sanctuary.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that 3,000 glide bombs hit targets in March. More Patriot air defenses were needed, he said, to stop the bombs from wreaking destruction on infrastructure. The U.S. is sending more Patriots, but interceptors are expensive. The cost-exchange ratio is unfavorable.

The most practical counter to glide bombs is to destroy the launching aircraft — on the ground or in the air. This can be done by employing a mix of tactical missiles, air-to-air capabilities and electronic warfare.

Ukraine is skillfully using tactical missiles and drones against ground targets. In May, long-range (as in 186 miles) U.S.-produced Army Tactical Missile Systems destroyed three advanced combat aircraft in Crimea.

In June, Ukraine fired at least 70 of its own drones against a faraway Russian airfield, possibly destroying three aircraft configured to launch glide bombs.

Under recently relaxed U.S. policy, Ukraine can fire Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, at forces in Russia that are attacking or about to attack Ukraine. But Ukrainians say this applies only to targets 60 or so miles inside Russia. The U.S. may be wise to permit ATACMS to strike distant airfields.

If even longer ranges are needed, the U.S. might provide air-launched, ground-attack Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles. The Finnish and Polish air forces rely on these low-observable arms.

Incoming Western equipment could offer a second way to neutralize glide bombs. Ukraine may soon acquire European F-16 fighters and two Swedish airborne early warning and control, or AEW&C, aircraft.

Pairing them would create a new capability, especially if the U.S. provided long-range (or 20-plus-mile) Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles. They could strike many aircraft before bombs were launched. Radar-guided AMRAAMs have a range longer than glide bombs.

Saab AEW&C aircraft will be a force multiplier. They can identify targets out to some 250 nautical miles and detect airborne and ground-based radars. This is essential to track and destroy distant aircraft and air defenses.

Although Ukraine’s F-16s will be older, they will have many modern electronics. This may include Link 16, a NATO-standard system to exchange tactical data. Flying over Ukraine at a safe distance, the AEW&C aircraft could vector F-16s to targets. Some proficient Swedish air battle managers may be needed until Ukrainians are fully trained.

Over time, the U.S. might also assist Ukraine to build a more substantial air force. Some retired F-16s and U.S. Navy E-2 Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft stored in Arizona could be refurbished for Ukraine.

Electronic warfare offers a third way to defeat glide bombs, by confusing their GLONASS or GPS satellite navigation systems. Electronic warfare works better against some systems than others. To protect critical infrastructure, Ukraine would need powerful jammers to block satellite signals over a wide expanse.

A glide bomb may rely on a backup inertial guidance system should satellite navigation fail, but this is less accurate for precision targeting. Errors increase the farther the bomb flies without satellite guidance.

In warfare, silver bullets are rare. Fighting often requires multiple capabilities and innovative or flexible use. More of both will be needed to enable Ukraine to defeat the glide bomb threat. Long-range tactical missiles, F-16s and AEW&C aircraft, plus advanced electronic warfare tools — and more flexible U.S. policies for their use — could give Ukraine a potent force.

John Hoehn is an associate policy researcher at the think tank Rand. He was previously a military analyst with the Congressional Research Service. William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at Rand. He previously served as the U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia and the U.S.-Soviet Commission.

I strongly argue that the administration and Congress must unite to fund the Air Force to ensure the continuity of this vital program. They also need to explore alternative design and acquisition strategies to significantly reduce the cost of NGAD and expedite the delivery of this critical capability.

By way of background, the family of systems known as NGAD — which includes a manned, penetrating, counter-air platform and unmanned collaborative combat aircraft — is the result of extensive Air Force and Department of Defense research, which began in 2014. This research concluded that America’s current air dominance assets would not remain sufficiently competitive against the systems of potential adversaries (especially China) into the 2030s.

Then-acquisition chief Frank Kendall was instrumental in this analysis and program from the start. He even made it the linchpin of one of his seven operational imperatives after becoming secretary of the Air Force. With China confirming that it is working on a sixth-generation fighter system to be completed by 2035, the importance of the NGAD program for the Air Force has become all the more apparent.

Enter the Fiscal Responsibility Act and its caps on defense spending; deficit concerns; and the bow-wave effect of must-pay bills for programs like the B-21 bomber, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program and rising personnel costs; the Air Force now finds itself on the horns of a dilemma for FY26 and beyond.

There’s not enough money to pay for all of it.

Moreover, the manned portion of NGAD is predicted to be even more expensive than the F-35 fighter, which, if true, does not bode well for America’s ability to eventually procure an adequate number of fighters. If the program encounters significant delays, the U.S. may once again find itself delivering a capability that has not kept pace with where the threat has advanced.

What, then, should we do?

First, I urge Congress and the DOD to provide adequate funds to the Air Force so that all these important programs remain on track.

Second, I urge the Air Force to consider innovative design and acquisition strategies — perhaps along the lines of the “century series” approach that former Air Force acquisition chief Will Roper once spoke of. This approach would involve less-expensive and quicker-to-produce fighters with iterative designs that could change every few years if necessary. Engaging in discussions with industry on such an approach is crucial, as it represents a very different way of doing business and we need to ensure its feasibility.

It’s time for us to come together, think outside the box and find new ways to support our military’s needs.

The only thing we can say for sure is that China is ruthlessly advancing its NGAD equivalent and does not appear to be slowing down due to budgetary concerns. Moreover, China is continuing aggressive actions in the South China Sea and has stepped up military drills that simulate a blockade and possible invasion of Taiwan.

The 2030s will be upon us in an instant, so we can’t afford to delay NGAD. Doing so would mean risking loss in a future conflict.

Deborah Lee James is a former secretary of the U.S. Air Force. She serves as chair of the Defense Business Board and is affiliated with several organizations and businesses.

Taken together, these three major developments — coupled with the collaborative combat aircraft intended to accompany them — are expected to drive $70 billion in probability-weighted spending between 2024 and 2030, according to Tamarack Defense’s military aircraft market forecast.

While production deliveries by 2030 for any of the major platforms are expected to be slim, we can see substantial increases in research and development spending across the board through the period. In the U.S., sixth-gen budgets grow from $4 billion in FY24 to $12.6 billion in FY29, the last year of the Future Years Defense Program — a total of $40.7 billion. Of this amount, roughly 91% is for research, development, test and evaluation. As designs mature, spending is expected to increase commensurately.

Tamarack Defense anticipates collaborative combat aircraft, or CCA, deliveries will take place earlier and in higher volumes than the larger platforms to which they are tied. In total, Tamarack Defense’s current factored production forecast across the U.S. Air Force’s and U.S. Navy’s CCA programs anticipates 255 deliveries by 2030, and 950 by 2033.

Outside the U.S., Tamarack Defense projects minimal production deliveries, but steady growth in development activity, with total contractor-available funding on the order of $2 billion to $3 billion per year for sixth-gen programs. Production deliveries for these programs remain beyond the 2030 horizon, but early prototypes are expected within the medium-term research and development plan.

Logan Slone is a co-founder of Tamarack Defense, a data analytics and advisory firm.