In an interview ahead of the Eurosatory conference in Paris, which runs June 17-21, the general commented on the changing security situation, capabilities the Army will demonstrate at Europe’s largest defense show, and how the armed forces must adapt to the “hyper-lethality” of the modern battlefield and evolving warfare.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

Given the evolving security landscape in Europe, what are the most critical areas of ground combat where increased European cooperation in the field of defense can help meet common military challenges?

Meeting common military challenges means being able to fight side by side and, ideally, together. Here I won’t go into the aspects of mutual knowledge and officer exchanges, which are vital but are part of a different time frame.

The first challenge is that of equipment interoperability — that is, the capacity to act in concert in spite of different equipment. This is about designing and producing natively interoperable equipment. On that point, communication networks are key. In this respect, the level of ambition of the CaMo partnership between the Belgian and the French units of the motorized brigade is remarkable. The units in the field will be interchangeable, without any technological or operational obstacle.

In addition to the combat system, Belgium and France collaborate in the field of operational concepts, education and training. This partnership is a model to follow to increase European defense cooperation.

France orders €1.1 billion of cannons, vehicles and helicopters

The second challenge is the capability to have military equipment designed and produced by several European countries. We have experience in this area: The Tiger and NH90 helicopters as well as the Milan and HOT missiles have been produced in cooperation between European partners.

The project for the future Franco-German heavy tanks, the Main Ground Combat System, is a vector of dynamism in Franco-German relations in terms of the defense industry. The MGCS will be more than just an improved successor to the Leclerc or Leopard tanks; it will be a new-generation system that will benefit from the best technologies of each of the nations involved in the program.

The third challenge is that of shared experiences. Cooperation is expressed in joint deployments in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and in the Sahel, which have led the European armies to share, interact and coordinate; the deployment of the French-German brigade in Mali in 2018 strikes me as particularly illustrative. Today, we are committed in a common support to the Ukrainian army.

Which key capabilities will the French Army present at Eurosatory? How do they align with France’s defense priorities?

Eurosatory will be showcasing the Scorpion range of vehicles, the variety of unmanned aerial vehicles used in the units and the network-enabled capability — the first steps toward collaborative combat. You’ll have the opportunity to see the Jaguar vehicle, the renovated Leclerc tank, the Griffon vehicle and the Serval vehicle.

The French army is an army of operational deployment and is a reference in Europe owing to its skills in aerocombat, the quality of its equipment and its operational experience. The NH90 Caiman, the Tiger and the Guepard helicopters will be presented to illustrate this air-mobile capability.

The Caesar Mk1 howitzer as well as the new-generation SAMP/T Mamba air defense system will demonstrate the Army’s determination to increase its combat power by speeding up the decision between intelligence collection and deep fires. Moreover, numerous UAVs and anti-UAV solutions will demonstrate our ambition in the field of aerial drone employment in air-ground combat.

Other items of equipment will be presented. You’ll discover how the Army is transforming itself to win tomorrow’s air-land battle.

The war in Ukraine has highlighted new tactics and technologies used on the battlefield. From France’s perspective, what are the biggest surprises or confirmations about modern warfare revealed by this conflict? Consequently, what adjustments is the French Army making to training doctrines and equipment priorities?

Let’s remain modest at this stage in the analysis of lessons learned from this conflict. We should try to discriminate the elements that are situational from what is structural. The extensive use of UAVs, like that of civilian technologies adapted for military use, has changed the dynamics of combat. The vital importance of electronic warfare, intelligence superiority, and the need to control information to influence both national and international public opinion has been confirmed.

Four structural priorities can be identified. The first priority is connectivity. To outclass the adversary, it is necessary to understand the tactical situation, design a plan, give orders, and carry out the maneuver by controlling and reorienting this cycle. Ensuring a smooth and rapid functioning of this cycle makes it possible to be quicker than the enemy and keep one’s freedom of action. The network-enabled combat developed in the framework of the Scorpion program has enabled us to be ahead in this area.

The second priority is the transparency of the battlefield. The use of UAVs and satellites increasingly makes it possible to pierce the fog of war. It makes it more difficult [for adversaries] to conceal intent, setups and movements. To enhance its in-depth detection capabilities, the Army is developing its UAV range, developing its means to analyze the images from all the sensors and is focusing its effort on electronic warfare.

The third priority is lethality. In the context of high-intensity warfare, lethality is characterized by tactical targeting through the use of increasingly powerful, accurate and sophisticated means of destruction — and in sufficient numbers to be able to cause considerable damage in a very short amount of time.

The fourth priority is protection. Hyper-lethality puts increased pressure on the survival and resilience capacity of high-value targets, including command posts, which are particularly easy to detect due to their electromagnetic footprint. Their protection must be enhanced; the command methods must be diversified to ensure their operational continuity in case of attack.

For the Army, this translates into the use of armor in the framework of the Scorpion vehicles; the entry into service of the ARLAD armored personnel carriers as of this year; and the development of ground-air defense through the modernization of the PAMELA vehicles.

How will emerging technologies influence the role of the French soldier in the coming decade? What measures are taking place to prepare Army personnel for an evolving battlefield?

Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics and autonomous systems will profoundly transform the soldier’s environment in the coming decade. AI will enhance decision-making by providing rapid, synthetic and accurate analyses of the combat situations. As for robotics, it will take on dangerous or repetitive tasks, such as mine clearance or reconnaissance in hostile terrain. Autonomous systems, such as UAVs and unmanned vehicles, will provide continuous surveillance and a rapid-reaction capability; our soldiers will therefore be less exposed.

In short, these technologies will provide greater security and an increased operational efficiency, redefining the missions and the required skills of the French soldiers in an increasingly technological operational context.

The French Army started to deploy Scorpion in 2021, one of the most ambitious modernization programs among Western land forces. What were the initial lessons learned, what challenges are being addressed and how has all this modified the way the service fights?

The Scorpion program is aimed at renewing and modernizing the contact combat capabilities of the Army with new platforms — such as the Griffon, Jaguar and Serval vehicles, as well as the MEPAC mounted mortar — and a single combat information system, known as SICS, over the 2020-2030 time frame. It ensures consistency between the capabilities of the combined arms battle group all the way to brigade level.

To achieve this, it federates and connects the platforms and combatants to promote collaborative combat, called “Scorpion combat,” consisting of understanding, deciding and acting more quickly than the enemy. The current development of Scorpion corresponds to a first level of collaborative combat, thanks to the modernization of the combat units around a command and information system bringing all the stakeholders of the combined arms battle group into a network.

Next, Scorpion will extend interconnection to all the players of the third dimension and to support units. A division-level experimentation exercise, Capstone 4, took place last March in the United States. It demonstrated our ability to implement “Scorpion combat” in an allied context. It highlighted the need to speed up our data transmissions at the joint level as well as with our allies.

Modern warfare is taking place across more domains — land, sea, air, space and cyberspace. How is the Army adapting to this multidomain battle space?

Modern warfare takes place in all the environments — land, air, sea, cyberspace and space — and fields —nonphysical and electromagnetic. We talk about multidomain, multi-field operations. In addition to the ground environment, the Army plays its part in the cyber domain and in the nonphysical fields.

To achieve that, in the framework of the Army transformation, I created the command for ground, digital and cyber support, known as CATNC, in January 2024. This command ensures the coherence of the organization as well as the overall functioning, operational deployment and evolution of the digital and cyber support fields in the defensive information technology warfare domain.

The Army also plays a crucial role in the information domain. Without the capacity to convince and to counter adverse influence, any military engagement can fail. The emergence of social networks has reinforced this notion and has significantly accelerated the dissemination of information, whether true or false, while increasing its volume, reach and resonance.

France has played a leading role in strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. What have you learned regarding the mobility and readiness of the French forces? Where is there room for improvement?

In response to the war in Ukraine and at the request of the allies, the armed forces deployed on Feb. 28, 2022, just four days after the Russian invasion, as the “spearhead” battalion of the NATO rapid reaction force to Romania. This rapid deployment made it possible to mobilize more than 500 French Army soldiers in a few days.

Since May 1, 2022, the deployed force has evolved into a multinational battalion, of which France is the framework nation. The French Armed Forces have also deployed a Mamba air defense detachment since May 16, 2022, a national support element, and a brigade forward command element. In total, more than 1,000 French soldiers are present in Romania.

These successive deployments show the reactivity and preparedness of our troops. The difficulties in the administrative, customs, interoperability and training domains have been overcome. We’re drawing the lessons with our European partners.

In an interview, its new director said the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, nicknamed America’s gatekeeper, is better known for conducting 95% of background investigations for federal workers and military personnel, but less so for its role protecting the nation’s industrial base.

David Cattler, who took the reins in March, wants to change that.

In an effort to centralize the government’s sprawling personnel security system, Congress sought to move this responsibility to DCSA from the Office of Personnel Management, which was finalized via an executive order in 2019. Now, Cattler said he’s in the midst of a “90-day approach” as the leader of an organization that should be at full performance in five years.

Background investigations move to their new home at the Pentagon

The White House has said small businesses are “the engines of the economy,” and it has told agencies like DCSA to ensure their participation in government contracts. Last year, they spent a record $178 billion on small businesses. DoD alone increased its spend by 8%.

There’s an imperative from government to extend a welcome to small businesses, and DoD has a growing portfolio of commercial technology and services that can diversify the industrial base. There’s also a need to ensure barriers to entry aren’t too high without compromising security. That’s where DCSA comes in.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

You’ve been in this role for a little less than three months. What’s new to you? What’s your vision for the agency?

I’m a big “first 90 days” person. This is one of several organizations I’ve either joined or created or led over the course of my career that is new or beginning or had some big issues that needed to be addressed. And this one’s no exception.

As far as the “first 90 days” approach, I tend to see this as an organization that after five years should be in full performance. In a lot of ways it is because it builds off a pretty strong legacy, whether you were formerly with the Office of Personnel Management or the Defense Department. We’re talking decades of experience and structure and qualification in the workforce.

The first thing that struck me in this 90 days is that we’re not actually fully confident in every way we should be. We’re not fully mature. Some things have to be worked out. If you put it in commercial terms, we’ve gone through a five-year period of strategic merger and acquisition, and that can be tough because you do need to have a mindset of one culture, one team, one brand.

This is a purpose-built security agency that combines a lot of elements from the legacy Office of Personnel Management and its authorities and statutory responsibilities, along with a similar and impressive set of things from DoD. And the expectations for what DCSA will do span across the federal government.

DCSA is not just America’s gatekeeper; DCSA should be the nation’s premier provider of integrated security services. So the first task is not to assert that we are that, but to have other people see us in that way, and relatedly to have them see us as their preferred partner.

How does DCSA interface with the defense-industrial base and its security?

If you’re outside the national security community, especially the security part of the national security community, and if you’re outside of the defense-industrial base, do you know who we are? I don’t think so. And that’s a real shame because taxpayers are paying $2.8 billion for it this fiscal year. I take this very seriously. You’re paying 15,000 people to do the work.

We were created as a result of yet another inflection point: the OPM hack. We’ve accreted some of these additional responsibilities like the insider threat role, in no small part because of the series, conditions and departmental analysis after the Navy Yard active shooter [incident], Fort Hood, and related tragedies and real problems within the security community to anticipate, detect, characterize, intervene and mitigate those sorts of threats.

If you work for a company, if you want to start one or if you want to keep up business at a company that requires a facility clearance, the odds are pretty good you’re going to work with DCSA. If you have a cyber problem, if you have an insider threat problem or if you have a counterintelligence problem, the odds are pretty good you’re going to interact with DCSA. If you want to be certified to be a professional in a space, or if you want to get better as a professional inside and outside government, you’ll likely interact with DCSA.

What is the ideal relationship between the agency and industry?

Security can be viewed by some as an overhead cost. It’s a must-do, but I’m going to go to compliance. Some — many even — may go the extra mile.

I sent a letter to our key partners in government and in the private sector when I first arrived, saying: “Call me directly, anytime. Send me an email I want to meet you all. I really want to hear from you. If I can help you, I will.”

We’re going to expand CEO-level and C-suite engagement. I get that security can be viewed as overhead and as a cost, but we need to practice security by design, which means that security really should be baked in from the very beginning. Security is a required element to one’s approach to tackling a contract — the same as it is for us in government before we embark on anything.

Be reasonable, particularly on the cost of compliance. You need to be efficient and effective. You don’t have to build to the minimum; you can build in some additions so that there’s more resilience and maybe some fallbacks or spillover so that you’ve got overlapping capabilities.

I was a little surprised by how warmly welcomed I was by industry. We are on the same team. And to be clear, it’s not that they think they’re going to have an easier time in a compliance inspection; that’s not what it is. It’s that you don’t start in an adversarial way. We want industry to be proved to be secure. Nobody who works for DCSA is going out trying to have someone lose their security clearance or fail on a facility clearance review.

So the relationship with industry is critically important. It’s very, very close. And it is mutually respectful, hopeful and very supportive.

The federal government is trying to increase business with small companies. How do you ensure the barriers to entry aren’t too high without cutting corners on security?

A lot of this stuff becomes about balance. We want to trust you. We want you, as a small business, to be able to compete. For classified work, we want you to be able to sustain the facility so you can do the work and compete for more work or different work. But that’s also about trust and the right balance.

Now that the internal directives have been approved, we’re moving forward with Section 847 implementation, [a provision from the fiscal 2020 National Defense Authorization Act that says DCSA will review Defense Department contracts that exceed $5 million for foreign ownership, control or influence in its supply chain]. The clock will soon start for that to be implemented. Put that human terms: Say I’m the CEO of a company that’s won a DOD contract of $5 million-plus. That’s just about everybody, right? We’re going to have to take a hard look at that coming in. We want 25 calendar days to complete our review.

That’s an inflection point in terms of responsibility, authority and accountability. There’s no one that works at DCSA that wants to be in a position to tell the CEO of a small business: “Sorry, that’s going to take 40 days, 80 days, 120 days.” We’re going to do everything we can to make sure we’re ready when the light turns green, to move forward and be able to satisfy that set of requirements.

That’s why we’ve asked again for more resources and proper authorities. Give us the guiding directives to get the policy framework built so that we know what we’re required to do.

If I put myself in the shoes of somebody in the private sector and ask myself, “Would I just spend money on security?” — maybe, maybe not.

But if the government came to me and explained — and we can and we do — the reason why we have changed this policy that will correspondingly increase cost is X, Y and Z, and we provide the expert that can give you the details, they get it.

Is that baseline trust there, or is DCSA in the rebuilding stage with industry and its stakeholders?

It’s there. The only thing that surprised me was how strongly positive these interactions have been. Industry is telling me: “Wouldn’t it be great if DCSA had more responsibility and authority?”

From a workforce perspective, DCSA conducts 95% of the federal government’s background clearances. How are you tackling the modernization of this system? What advice do you have for someone who’s looking to get cleared for the first time?

One bit of advice I would give to somebody that’s coming in from the outside is: Plan ahead and be realistic.

If you’ve never held a security clearance and you wish to pursue a government job that requires one, it could take some time. Hiring is one thing; onboarding is another.

The second thing I would say is: Be honest. When you open that eApp form and you start typing, fill it out completely and honestly. Don’t overthink it. Not to sound harsh or overly dramatic, but we’re going to find out about things because we’ve got awesome people and great databases, and we’re going to check you six ways to Sunday before we put you in a position of trust. So be honest. A mistake that you made that you’ve picked yourself up from and recovered and moved on from — that’s perfectly understandable. Nobody’s perfect.

The next thing I would stress to people coming in from the outside is: If you’ve had a security clearance and it’s fairly recent, and you are enrolled in [continuous vetting], you can actually be re-onboarded, re-adjudicated and authorized for onboarding very quickly. And that’s another element of Trusted Workforce, [a whole-of-government approach to reforming the personnel security process].

Reciprocity is also a piece of this. If you come into the DOD, I’m proud to say that the DCSA team can get that done for your employer in less than one day. Reciprocity going in other directions can be more of a challenge.

What’s the latest on timelines for security clearances?

When we talk about the timelines that are in Trusted Workforce — and where we are with the inventory and the goals — what we’re tracking right now is the toughest 10% of cases.

So in 90% of the cases, you’re going to move quite quickly through because you probably haven’t had a brush with the law or you haven’t traveled extensively.

Many of the things we’re looking for in terms of potential indicators where — it’s not a bar to your clearance or a bar to your re-clearance, it’s just something that gets flagged for investigation and adjudication, and we have to take a deeper look. That deeper look can take time. And that time can aggregate.

Especially after the COVID-19 pandemic, we continue to do interviews remotely, but we also do a great number of interviews and investigations in person. It can be challenging. People are working from home, sometimes in remote areas. They’re working odd schedules. Your references need to be checked, and they’re working from home, they’re working on schedules, they’re traveling. That all takes time to get through.

Among its total inventory, the Army is equipped with Javelin anti-armor missiles, 105mm light guns, and eight-wheel drive light armored vehicles each featuring a 25mm gun. Recently introduced equipment includes the 5.56mm MARS-L rifle and the Australian-made four-wheel drive Bushmaster infantry vehicle.

Like the country’s naval and air forces, the Army has suffered severe attrition in recent years, partly due to remuneration and the state of military housing. Nevertheless, the finance minister announced in January 2024 that government agencies must identify annual savings, including 7.5% from the Defence Ministry and 6.5% from the military, ahead of the budget, due May 30.

In February, the armed forces said that amid gaps in end strength, they were worried about the remaining staff who are “shouldering significant burden” to ensure major equipment and platforms remained at the ready.

Then on March 25, the chief of the defense force, Air Marshal Kevin Short, announced that Boswell will retire June 9.

During his 40 years of service, Boswell served with the United Nations in Angola, East Timor and the Middle East. Defense News recently connected with the Army chief to discuss the state of the force, ongoing modernization programs and the lingering effects of the pandemic. This interview was edited for length and clarity.

What were your goals as Army chief?

On assuming command, I focused the Army’s effort very clearly toward becoming a modern, agile, highly adaptive, light combat force. Modernization involved giving momentum to the Network Enabled Army and Protected Mobility Capability programs as well as continuous improvement through the ongoing soldier modernization program.

Agility is the need for an army — even a small one — to provide the government with options across the spectrum of conflict while maintaining force structures able to task, organize, and — if required — reorganize as quickly as possible and as often as needed to meet changing requirements.

Our operating concept was to be framed by highly professional, highly capable special forces and light infantry, artillery and armor supported by agile, responsive combat support and combat service support.

How is the Network Enabled Army program coming along?

The program is a foundational requirement to achieving a networked, combat-capable force able to operate in a multidomain, multinational combat environment. It will provide the Army with a range of capabilities with which it can collect, transmit, manage and disseminate data in the contemporary operating environment.

Significant progress has been made in this space as we identify and introduce into service the equipment and systems that will enable our Army to better meet the challenges of an increasingly complex and uncertain security environment.

What are the easiest and most challenging aspects of your job?

The smoothest was, without question, having the support of incredibly competent commanders and staff at all levels across the Army. We really are fortunate with the caliber of people within the Army, and having the opportunity to lead them was both humbling and an honor.

With respect to the most challenging aspect of my time as the chief of the Army: the COVID-19 period, and the Army’s decisive commitment to our nation’s COVID-19 response, which was significant. [The pandemic had] wide-ranging impacts on the Army — mostly negative.

Challenges with retention, the generation and maintenance of individual and collective capabilities, and the effective introduction into service of new equipment, vehicles and infrastructure have all been impacted. A lot of work took place in the last 12 or so months to give energy, purpose and direction to the Army’s post-COVID-19 regeneration, but we still have some ways to go.

Without question, the toughest thing to deal with has been how environmental factors have, in a relatively short space of time, impacted the number of experienced professionals within the Army. For the vast majority of our command and specialist appointments, we can’t recruit directly and have to attract, train and retain these people.

In the last three years our Army has lost some absolute treasure due to disillusionment with our role during COVID-19, a lack of operational deployments, and external employment opportunities offering more variety and significantly better remuneration.

Commanders at all levels, both within Army and across the New Zealand Defence Force, have worked hard to shift the dial in this space. We are now seeing the results of that effort. It is, however, a circumstance we won’t quickly recover from and are going to have to remain focused on.

How is the hiatus on training and operations that took place during the pandemic still affecting the force?

We are still able to provide the government with immediate response options across the spectrum of conflict, should it choose to commit the Army to an operational theater. Sustaining those commitments for an extended period is problematic because of the gaps we currently have, post-COVID-19, in key specialist, trade and command appointments.

What is foremost on your wish list for the Army, in terms of personnel and equipment?

With respect to personnel, the chief people officer, with support from across the New Zealand Defence Force, including the Army, is leading a range of initiatives reviewing remuneration, conditions of service and allowances. Landing this effort and then resourcing it accordingly will not be easy, but it has to happen, and it has to happen quickly.

From an equipment perspective, giving real momentum to the Network Enabled Army, Protected Mobility Capability and soldier modernization programs will both enable aging capabilities to be replaced and ensure the force is equipped to operate effectively in the contemporary environment.

How does the Army contribute to the defense of its Western allies?

The New Zealand Defence Force is a combat-capable military force, trained, equipped and ready to respond every hour of the day, every day of the year. We contribute to international peace and security and the rules-based order through deployments of importance to New Zealand.

The New Zealand Army has a bilateral service cooperation plan, dubbed Plan Anzac, with the Australian Army. How has that impacted your force?

Plan Anzac reflects a broader defense relationship, one that is open, based on mutual respect and is enduring. It reflects the value of land power to both nations, and the value that interoperability between the Australian and New Zealand armies brings to combined joint operations.

The agreement makes sure both armies can work as efficiently as possible, complementing each other’s capabilities and capacity. It provides a focus and framework to take ongoing conversations and engagements between allies and mates, and then formalize these to improve existing cooperation.

We are able to better share lessons across capability development, doctrine for training, and many other areas related to the generation and — in the New Zealand Army’s current case — the regeneration of land combat capability.

Is the New Zealand Army’s culture at risk amid Australian input, or vice versa?

We have much more in common than we have differences, but we will always be who we are as Kiwis. And our Aussie mates will always be who they are. Ultimately we are a pretty potent mix and always the better off when we come together in pursuit of a common cause.

How will the military recover from attrition and a lack of experience before the next conflict breaks out?

The New Zealand Defence Force recognizes it will take some years to fully recover the workforce due to the time needed to train suitably qualified and experienced personnel. Despite this, the program to retain, recruit and reenlist people is showing dividends, with the regular force’s attrition reducing from over 15% this time last year to 10.3% as of Feb. 29, 2024.

Over the past year or more, specific targeted payments to critical trades, and a general forcewide retention payment, have been made as part of a range of initiatives to address attrition rates. These payments have been largely funded from unspent personnel expenditure. When facing workforce challenges, steps need to be taken to address them, so prioritization has been given to critical areas of need across the New Zealand Defence Force.

Are the public and politicians adequately aware of national security threats?

New Zealand is becoming more aware of the geostrategic challenges that we face as a nation. Without question, various agencies of government have a key role to play in monitoring and advising security threats. But equally it is important to recognize the role that other institutions play, such as academia and the media.

Is the military making the best use of domestic industry and academia?

Like anything we do, there is always room for improvement. The New Zealand Defence Force’s relationship with both industry and academia is no different and will only keep going from strength to strength, given the mutual respect and positive engagement that occurs between all parties.

How does climate change affect the balance between training for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and practicing for combat?

The primary focus of the Army’s training is and always will remain combat. Forces led, trained and equipped for combat can rapidly adjust to the requirements of support operations when the need arises.

Who are your heroes?

My family. They have sacrificed so much to allow me to serve for as long as I have and in the way that I have. I owe them a debt of thanks that I’m not sure I can ever repay.

Defense News on Feb. 9 talked to Parker about how the Army is working to integrate its modern capabilities on the battlefield to provide a layered approach to addressing a widening array of complex threats, as seen in Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s invasion and in the Middle East.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

Some programs among various cross-functional teams are transitioning to other portfolios, particularly Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, in your case. How is that coming along for major programs like the Integrated Battle Command System and Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense?

We would like everything to be able to transition into a program of record. You’ve hit on two of our signature modernization efforts. As we look at M-SHORAD Increment 1 — our kinetic version — we are currently fielding our third battalion for that at Fort Cavazos, Texas, with our first battalion in Germany and the second battalion at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

PEO Missiles and Space is heavily involved with that. When we look at M-SHORAD Inc 1, that initially came out as part of a directed requirement.

We are moving through the requirements process, we briefed the Protection Functional Capabilities Board in December, and we got the [Joint Capabilities Board] scheduled for April for an Inc 1 capabilities development document.

We continue to codify those requirements, specifically for sustainment of the capability. That’s going to put us in a good place to get this thing fully transitioned and get that capability to the warfighter.

IBCS is our other big signature effort. It is a program of record. A full-rate production decision has been made. PEO Missiles and Space is working on that.

[We are looking at] software upgrades to the system to be able to incorporate additional capability. We’ve established a governance process where we [consider] additional capabilities to incorporate within the system, and we’re able to prioritize that from not only a material developer but from a capability developer standpoint with the proponent at Fort Sill.

We want to transition all of our programs over to the two Army capability managers.

We’re still on track for fielding to the first unit in fiscal 2025.

The Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation recently released a report with a section on integrated air and missile defense. A full operational test and evaluation for IBCS was scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of FY24. Is that on track? As the report mentioned, that FOT&E will evaluate how well deficiencies were corrected.

There were some challenges noted in the initial operational test and evaluation, and that’s part of our prioritization process we look at about every month.

We are currently working through that to make sure they are addressed and we have those fixed for FOT&E. That is on schedule.

That’s part of the bigger complex problem PEO Missiles and Space has — three signature modernization efforts all inherently linked together between IBCS, the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor, and the Indirect Fire Protection Capability, all being fielded on a very similar timeline — and making sure all those efforts are integrated. It is not an [enviable] task. That’s why they essentially came up with the integrated fires test campaign we’re now on, leading up to that FOT&E for IBCS.

It’s about working those development efforts simultaneously. PEO Missiles and Space is doing a great job making sure these development efforts are synchronized because one slip and we could be looking at a domino effect. That’s why the second and third order effects to other programs are part of that conversation.

The integrated fires test campaign is designed to support milestone decisions we have coming up for each of the programs. Everything is currently on track. That’s the good-news story, but your “spidey senses” are always looking for where that hiccup could happen that then creates a domino effect across three programs.

The Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor is in testing now. You’ve received radars. The front end and the back end will come together later. How are things going?

There’s been no change to the plan. This program has had challenges, but the thing that’s really reinforced my confidence as of late was the flight testing that happened this past quarter — two successful engagements on the front end against surrogate threat targets.

Now we are looking toward integrating that back-end piece as well so that we actually have the full 360-degree capability. It’s still in development, but some of the initial feedback was positive.

The Indirect Fire Protection Capability is another program that has taken longer than expected. Please provide an update on the Army’s receipt of the first IFPC launchers. There was also a request for information that came out for a second interceptor.

[IFPC is an] important piece of the puzzle. This is definitely a concept we’ve had coming for a while. The good news is we have launchers now out on the ranges.

The PEO Missiles and Space team recently had a successful launch of an AIM-9 missile off one of our launchers. I’m looking down the road toward that continual developmental testing we have coming up, all leading toward test flights and IOT&E, [expected] in 2026.

We’re going to have a cruise missile-capable interceptor with the AIM-9X. [The second interceptor] is about more advanced capabilities.

[The PEO Missiles and Space program executive officer], Brig. Gen. Frank Lozano, and his team are working diligently as they get their request for information responses back.

You are designing a multimission launcher for IFPC. How is the Army looking at a wider variety of interceptors beyond one or two types? What is realistic to have in the family of interceptors that could be part of IFPC?

I have had a lot of conversations about interceptors lately. A specific lesson we’re taking out of Ukraine is there’s no silver bullet. What is working for Ukraine is a layered system-of-systems approach.

I’m kind of frequency hopping over [the topic of] counter-unmanned aerial system [technology]. How do we get ahead of the cost curve? Some of these small UASs are developed for a few [hundred dollars] or a few [thousand]. The commander on the ground will fire [at] that to save lives or protect an asset, but I’d rather not have to force them into that corner.

We’re taking a look at some low-cost solutions. We’re taking a look at how we can increase magazine depth. We’re taking a look at capabilities such as the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon, the less expensive Hydra rocket variants that potentially get after that cost curve but still provide a level of lethality we would need to combat two or three small UAS threats.

The same can apply for IFPC; the counter-cruise missile fight; the Patriot air defense system for [the Lower Tier Future Interceptor] in bridging some littoral space; and the Patriot and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems.

The counter-small UAS mission is relatively new for the AMD CFT. How is that taking shape? How are you supporting the Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office as well as the Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office?

You kind of hit the nail on the head in terms of it taking a village, especially with this mission set. Case in point: I just met with the Air Force Research Laboratory on what it’s developing.

In April 2022, there were four signature modernization efforts [for AMD CFT]. A couple months later, we had five. So as we talk about evolving, that’s one of the things we’re continuing to transform on.

We are currently in the process of fielding our first two division sets. It’s the first phase of that first division set fielding —primarily the handheld capabilities we’re procuring.

That will be followed, before the end of the year, with essentially phase two, which is focused more on the Low, slow, small, unmanned aircraft Integrated Defeat System, the Ku-band Radio Frequency Sensor radars, [and] the Coyote variants. Those capabilities [will go] to the first two divisions.

What observations from warfare in Ukraine and the Middle East are influencing what your team does?

Some of the stuff is potentially in the realm of machine learning and being able to help system operators make decisions.

We are continuing to look at how the threat is evolving with respect to speed, with respect to hardening defense mechanisms that platforms have in terms of payload, capacity, battery life — all these things that can enhance their capability.

The Army wants to replace the Stinger missile. Where does that effort stand?

That’s Inc 3 of M-SHORAD. Inc 1 is the kinetic version we’re currently fielding; Inc 2 is our directed-energy version we’re working on with the Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office.

Inc 3 is two things primarily: one is the next-generation Stinger, two is the 30mm proximity fuse ammunition.

Both are helping us gain capability within that M-SHORAD [space] and over to the counter-UAS space. With the next-generation Stinger, we are looking at increasing or getting better capability than we had with our previous generation.

There are two main competitors for the [Stinger replacement] competition PEO Missiles and Space is handling.

What else is getting your attention beyond specific portfolio items?

One of the things we’re starting to look toward is a human-machine interface. We’re going to [carry out] some engagements and try to learn as much as we can.

I’m not trying to look at it from a platform perspective, but a system perspective in terms of what we can leverage that’s already been done, and how can we adjust that in order to be able to focus on an air defense-type system on top of it.

The government appointed Judith Collins to the role in October. She’s also the attorney general; the minister for the Government Communications Security Bureau; the minister in charge of digitizing the government; the minister of the Security Intelligence Service; the minister of science, innovation and technology; and the minister of space.

The New Zealand Defence Force’s briefing to the new minister noted the country faces a “challenging strategic environment” not seen for decades, adding that climate change is “of increasing concern.”

While the briefing explained the military is energized by newly acquired equipment, it also cautioned personnel could feel overwhelmed, given they are charged with maintaining the existing inventory while adopting more materiel.

Furthermore, the force has been experiencing retention and recruitment issues. While deployments are “a key motivator for our people,” the diminishing number of qualified and experienced people called upon to deploy is problematic, the briefing noted. “Although recruitment of new personnel continues, unlike civilian staff, uniformed personnel cannot be recruited from the general labor market, as their skills take years to acquire and that training occurs inside the force.”

Defense News put these concerns and more to the minister in a Feb. 8 interview, which was edited for length and clarity.

The previous government released a defense policy and strategy document in August 2023. What do you think of it?

The defense strategy released last year reflected the changing strategic environment and the need to update New Zealand’s policy settings to a more proactive and deliberate approach to security and defense. That geopolitical tension has, if anything, increased since its release.

When will the next defense whitepaper arrive?

Work is underway on a Defence Capability Plan, which will signal the government’s future investment intentions for defense.

What are your priorities for defense and the three armed services?

Retention, interoperability, innovation and international partnerships are my priorities for defense. This includes giving our personnel more opportunities to do what they signed up for and looking at how we can do things differently.

We must take every opportunity to engage with our international partners so we can further our national interests and ensure the New Zealand perspective is heard. We must also listen so we can contribute meaningfully, and be open to new opportunities where they align with our interests.

To what do you attribute the shortage of recruits and the high attrition in the New Zealand Defence Force?

There are several drivers behind the high attrition rates at NZDF, including remuneration, a strong labor market and highly skilled defense personnel being in demand. The NZDF is working on a number of initiatives to address attrition issues. As of late December 2023, the overall regular force’s attrition rate — across all three services — was 11.9%, down from 15.6% 10 months earlier.

In mid-2023, Air Marshal Kevin Short, the chief of the NZDF, told Defense News that the war in Ukraine has emphasized the importance of the military’s supply chain. He said the force would “look at its ‘just in time’ approach, and adjust to a ‘just in case’ approach.” With the demand for ammunition soaring, has New Zealand had to wait longer than usual for ammo, particularly as the country modifies its acquisition approach?

The NZDF is experiencing longer ammunition and explosive procurement lead times than historically normal, but it is wrong to say it has moved from “just in time” to “just in case” ordering. The NZDF orders ammunition to meet stockholdings that support training and force generation, as well as to maintain stockholdings necessary to meet contingencies.

New Zealand is a nation of islands, yet the Navy is the least funded and staffed of the services. Why is that? Will this change?

The NZDF is funded and equipped based on the priorities of the government of the day and continues to serve at the direction of the government of the day, with the equipment and staffing it has available.

Work on future opportunities for the maritime fleet began last year, with market research being undertaken and 49 responses received. The next stage will be advice to the government on next steps for future investment intentions for defense, and I look forward to sharing more details at that stage.

The second pillar of AUKUS — the defense cooperation agreement between Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. — could benefit New Zealand’s defense industry and military. Talk about that potential opportunity.

We are actively looking for ways in which New Zealand can participate in AUKUS’ second pillar, as discussed at the Australia-New Zealand Ministerial Consultations 2+2 meeting in early February between the foreign affairs and defense ministers of both New Zealand and Australia.

Australian officials will visit New Zealand as soon as possible to discuss opportunities for New Zealand to join, and in what areas we can add value. I expect it will be in technology and space, which are both areas that offer opportunities to New Zealand businesses and scientists. We expect to take a formal decision on participation at some point this year as details emerge.

We do expect that the second pillar could create potential openings for collaboration with the New Zealand’s defense industry and adjacent technology companies. Collaboration between Australia’s and New Zealand’s defense industries is something we actively encourage, and we are always looking for ways to reduce barriers.

Will New Zealand establish a space command?

There are no current plans for a space command under New Zealand’s joint forces. The development of a Defence Capability Plan currently underway will consider investment options, including options for space, against the government’s priorities, policy settings and financial considerations.

What more might New Zealand do to support Ukraine as it fights off a Russian invasion?

New Zealand continues to stand with Ukraine in complete solidarity for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. New Zealand’s support to Ukraine’s self-defense since Russia’s invasion has included economic, diplomatic and military elements. As part of this ongoing support, NZDF deployments that provide support and training to Ukraine are continuing.

Several European military leaders have warned their citizens about a potential war with Russia. Do you envisage issuing a similar alert?

Comments made domestically by other countries are a matter for them, and I do not have a comment to make on these.

The office is the service’s hub for commercial engagement, partnering with several other programs and initiatives, including SpaceWERX — the Space Force’s innovation arm — and Space Systems Command’s Front Door, an online portal companies can use to connect with the acquisition community. It’s also leading the establishment of a Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve, an effort to scale up its use of commercial capabilities during a conflict.

The Commercial Space Office’s creation came amid a push within the Space Force to strengthen its partnership with commercial industry. Officials have called for the acquisition workforce to consider opportunities to buy services and systems from industry — rather than build a bespoke government satellite — wherever possible.

Col. Richard Kniseley, who leads the office, recently sat down with C4ISRNET at the Space Mobility Conference in Orlando, Florida. He talked about the office’s accomplishments over the last year and its priorities for 2024.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

What has your office done since its creation last year?

We marched forward with the Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve, and stood up that task force with many Department of Defense subject matter experts to really flesh out that framework. That all culminated in a successful briefing to Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall around September where he said: “Go forth and prosper.” He considered this good news and a step in the right direction, especially as we’re looking at great power competition.

The SSC Front Door has been meeting with many different industry members every day. This past August, we onboarded a new website and share tool. Since then, we’ve met with over 200 industry members. The goal of that website was to have faster response time, to make sure that we were assessing industry, understanding their maturity levels, and then understanding the mission areas they can play in so that we can get them to the right mission area owner.

Our alignment with SpaceWERX has proved very successful. We aligned a SpaceWERX challenge with one of our first reverse industry days out of the gate, which was alternative positioning, navigation and timing. The goal of that was to seed industry, but also to keep a lot of the conversations going and mature capabilities.

We also awarded, out of the Commercial Satellite Communications Office, the Proliferated Low Earth Orbit contract, which was a $900 million [indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract]. It went out to 20 different vendors and covered many different mission areas. We didn’t want to hone in just on commercial SATCOM, so we opened it up to alternative position, navigation and timing, as well as space domain awareness, to name a few. The goal out of that was to capitalize on dual-use capabilities.

So we are not slowing down in 2024; it is going to be a very busy year, and we’ve already got a number of different things on the horizon.

How do you expect the Proliferated Low Earth Orbit contractor pool to grow? What value will that bring to the Space Force?

While it was awarded to 20 providers, we are onboarding new providers. In fact, we have an onboarding period right now, which ends in May, where new providers can reach out to the Commercial SATCOM Office and be evaluated as a provider on that contract.

It allows the contractors to propose areas where they can benefit the Department of Defense. It’s a very open contract, and it allows us to work and reach out with a lot of those providers. But that contract also allows us to combine a lot of different requirements across the Department of Defense into one award, so that we’re not doing one award, one award, one award. The first task order that got awarded to SpaceX combined requirements from over 70 different agencies.

So it’s the ability to get better pricing and economic order quantity by combining a lot of those requirements. It allows us to get more providers on, understand their capabilities, and get those commercial capabilities out to the warfighter and better integrated across the space enterprise.

The Space Mobility Conference saw a heavy focus on space servicing. What is your office doing in this area? How are you engaging with the companies developing these capabilities?

A great deal of the companies that have been coming through the Front Door that we have been meeting with have been companies aligning themselves with servicing, mobility and logistics. So whether we have companies that are looking at the refueling aspect of it, companies that are looking at the repair aspect of it or even the maneuverability aspect of it — there is a great deal of innovation and expertise in those different areas.

What we’ve been doing is assessing these companies for their maturity level, but also one of the functions of the Front Door is to take a look at the investments in those companies — venture capital and also any potential nefarious capital. We do want to be investing in companies that are on the up and up. But at the same time, we’re also looking at companies where the government can be one of many customers and not just be a crutch to lean on.

We’ve been bridging that gap between the companies and the mission areas. We’ve been introducing a lot of great companies to the Assured Access to Space team — so looking for investment opportunities there as well as working with the Space Systems Integration Office. They are looking at the overall enterprise and where does servicing, mobility and logistics fit into that overall architecture.

You can only imagine what those capabilities will do for the mission because you will be able to refuel some of our [high-value] space vehicles, which allows them to stay on orbit longer and do more mission passes.

Some of the technologies that are coming into play have a lot more size, weight and power so that while they can be carrying space vehicles to many different orbits, these things can also carry gas cans on them. They have more abilities to stay on orbit longer. You can even deploy them, and you don’t even need to use the space vehicles right away; they could just sit there in a loiter state, which kind of lends itself a little bit more to the logistics side of the house. You could save the gas on those space vehicles and have them ready, which also lends itself more to a tactically responsive space standpoint.

What are the most important parts of the Space Force’s upcoming commercial space strategy?

It’s going to do two things. One, it’s going to be a very clear message to the government that because of the threats, we need to change how we do things. Resting on building everything in house is just not palatable anymore. We need to integrate with commercial [sectors] at better scale. It recognizes how the commercial industry is innovating every single day. A lot of the expertise is out there.

What the strategy is also going to do is be a signal to industry of areas of importance to us. We’re not going to prioritize areas, but it will be very clear some of the areas that are very important to the government. Throughout the strategy, there will be kind of a mixture of strategy, but also some implementation. So there’ll be some actions that will be in that strategy, and then it will also be further fleshed out with implementation plans that will be released after the strategy is released.

The Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve, or CASR, framework received approval last fall. How is your office implementing that?

My No. 1 focus is working with [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the National Space Council on a threat-sharing model. The Department of Defense has a few of them that we are exploring.

We are working to develop a surveillance plan for CASR membership. That’s really going to lend itself into the reliability construct, ensuring they stay in good standing as a member. Are they still investing in their cyber capabilities? Are they able to surge or adhere to the contract as planned? And even looking at some of their manufacturing capabilities. Once we get you to that membership, we need to make sure you’re ready for what that potential bad day might be.

We’re also integrating right now with tactically responsive space [team]. We want to inject CASR fundamentals and exercises into one of their next capability exercises. I could easily see a scenario of a surging of capability, or even potentially taking space vehicles off a production line for a CASR need. That’s really going to help us exercise the contract and the concept of operations.

We are starting to develop the concept of operations, partnered with U.S. Space Command, primarily looking at commercial satellite communications as the first one. Putting that to paper is going to help us work toward exercises as well. But then after that, it’s really working on securing funding.

When will you start putting companies on contract for CASR?

We’re going to start fleshing out the contract pieces a little bit more this year.

I promised this to industry: We will still have a couple more industry offerings so that I can be completely transparent with them before they start seeing this in contracts. I almost want to get a litmus test from them and make sure that I’m going down the right path, especially as we’re starting to develop our incentive plan.

I’m going to potentially have something this year, but probably 2025.

You previously said it’s important to have a sustained budget line, or program element, for commercial space capabilities, including CASR. Where does that effort stand?

I’m anxiously waiting on the appropriations bill. If all goes well, the appropriations bill could be the mechanism that starts the commercial space program element. There was some language in the Senate Appropriations Committee markup that pretty much allows for the creation of it, and I just want to see if that language makes its way through. Those dollars were specifically targeted at commercial surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking, so that would be a budget activity created under the commercial space piece. We’re waiting to see the outcome of that one.

What other efforts would receive funding under that new budget line?

We’re definitely looking at the funding of some enterprise capabilities, like funding for exercises, funding for threat sharing — all of that.

There will need to be an enduring CASR line in there to keep that overall enterprise together. Some of the biggest feedback we got from industry was that we need to understand what’s going on with the threat. And I totally resonated with that because that’s going to help them be more responsive to our needs. It’s going to help inform their business area. If they’re a CASR member, then that’ll help them indicate when a call-up might be OK.

Brig. Gen. Mike Zuhlsdorf is a key player in those discussions. He serves as the deputy director for resource integration under the Air Force’s logistics, engineering and force protection branch.

As other defense officials negotiate with foreign leaders for access to bare-bones airfields and more established bases overseas, it’s Zuhlsdorf’s team that is figuring out how to turn those sites into valuable Air Force lily pads in a maritime-dominant region for the decades ahead.

Zuhlsdorf spoke to Air Force Times at the Pentagon on Dec. 15. This interview was edited for length and clarity.

Is the Air Force talking to other countries about using foreign bases that already exist, or are you considering building new sites?

We are not putting in new bases. These are bases and airfields that we’ve had since World War II, where we were able to hopscotch across the Pacific to ultimately get close enough to Japan. There are a lot of airfields like that, whether it’s in the first island chain — Japan down through the Philippines — or the second island chain, near Guam and Tinian.

We’re talking about renovating, rejuvenating and rehabilitating. We will make sure the pavement is still viable, trim back the vegetation where the jungle has encroached on the runway, and set up the basic essentials that we need in the event that we need to flush aircraft from a hub into these spokes, keep them safe and then turn them.

What do we need? Things like fuel; major aircraft parts that six to 12 airmen might be able to fix there; maybe some munitions [and airfield repair resources]; the essential lighting or navigational systems for nighttime operations. A little bit of base air defense might be part of that, or camouflage, concealment and deception. Almost all the hubs will have a command, control and communication system that will fly in with them so that we can maintain connectivity to the mothership at all times.

We are working with allies and partners. Pacific Air Forces has identified airfields that we want to invest in, and they’re going to work with the Philippines and Australia to do that. We are teaming with them on some projects that will allow us to get fuel out there, some munitions capability and other long-range transport aircraft that would come in and be able to resupply.

Read all Military Times coverage of China

Which existing airfields are currently on the list?

There are more in the second island chain that we are identifying. There are additional airfields that are in Guam and a few in the first island chain that we’ll eventually get to.

What we’re trying to do is nail down access and overflight stuff before a formal announcement would come out. Those that have been in the press are the ones where we’ve already teamed with those countries. We are working with other allies and partners in the area to secure that very critical access, overflight and basing.

[Editor’s note: A spokesperson for the Air Force’s international affairs branch declined to provide specifics about which countries the U.S. is in talks with to host air operations abroad.]

Will the Air Force expand Andersen Air Force Base on Guam or other areas on the island?

We have projects for some hangars that are going in at Andersen, and at some of the chosen hubs we want to operate out of, maybe a spoke or two — wherever we decide is optimal. We’re looking to maybe throw up a shelter system that allows us to safeguard critical equipment. We need to take into account the sustainment of all that equipment we pre-position, and so we will want to put those into a controlled-environment facility so that when we need it, it’ll operate as advertised.

We’re also thinking about protecting those hubs and spokes so that the airmen, soldiers, sailors, Marines and guardians that we’re going to send out there will be as safe as possible. There’s a big threat from ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles. We’re trying to make sure those airmen can turn those aircraft as advertised.

None of us who wear this uniform are looking for war. Our job is to be prudent with taxpayer dollars, and what the American people want from us is to plan.

What’s the timeline to open these sites? How are you phasing them in?

Two to three future years defense programs (FYDP). We are working through [which sites should be prioritized].

Is 10-15 years too long?

We’re going to see concrete stuff within a [five-year] FYDP and it will continue to manifest through that time period. We’ve got some weapon systems in the queue — Next Generation Air Dominance, collaborative combat aircraft. It’ll happen in that window.

What are you learning from Air Force spokes across Europe that you’ve used in partner countries since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022? How are you applying those lessons to the Pacific?

This is a unique opportunity for us. We’ve been in U.S. Central Command, and being able to move pieces, parts, munitions, aircraft, personnel and everything like that has been relatively uncontested. Yes, the Army has had some challenges there when you talk about the main supply routes, but generally it was not a contested environment. Ukraine is a contested environment, and logistics lessons that we learn are invaluable.

What are the critical pieces and parts that they need? How did they get these parts from location X to location Y? Did they use this system or that system? How did they pull the data? We are rapidly getting to a data analytics framework that’s going to allow us to visibly see what supplies and equipment we need. We’re going to be able to throw that up into a basing and logistics data analytics environment that’s going to allow us to, as logisticians, figure out where we need to put the next aircraft part or the next load of fuel.

Russia and Ukraine have a lot of small unmanned aerial systems that are impeding each other’s progress. How are they tracking those systems? How are they taking those systems down? How are they doing air defense for air bases? Those lessons are being gathered up.

What is the proposed cost for Pacific basing projects in fiscal 2025?

We’re working through FY25. That’s part of the resourcing our senior leaders are churning through right now.

There hasn’t been a profound change in counter-drone technology over the past several years. Where does that capability stand and what would you like to see?

We are probably still nascent. We literally just had conversations about this — within the last four or five months — about expanding and investing more in that very important battlespace. There’s a lot of research and a lot of dollars that are being applied to that problem set. You see that coming into play not only in the Ukrainian-Russian war, but also now with Hamas and Israel.

Are small drones a threat in the Pacific, despite the region’s significant size?

These are all islands, and they all have an indigenous population. You can rest assured that there’s probably people who don’t like the United States on those islands. Some of these smaller systems could absolutely impact an air tasking order. To protect the integrity of that air tasking order, we need to think through how we can get at that small threat, while other people are thinking through those ballistic missiles and those hypersonic missiles.

It is a full-spectrum air defense platform for an air base that we’re looking at, along with the camouflage, concealment and deception program, electronic warfare, and all these bits and pieces.

What are the main hurdles to achieving this vision?

One of the big problems is not having a budget. When you think about procurement lines that we need to stand up and invest in, we absolutely need Congress’ help in getting a budget passed so we can get the capabilities that we know we need.

There’s always the joint interoperability piece that we are yearning for, and the ability to share information with our allies and partners. We’re trying to work a little bit more aggressively on what information we can share with them, and what tactics, techniques and procedures we might be able to share. We’ve had success in Australia recently on some refueling efforts with the F-35 fighter jet. That’s a big success.

We’re breaking down barriers where we can to make sure that we’ve got the necessary capability and that everybody understands what that is. We’re sending people over to Japan right now to work with them even closer on exercises and on different weapons systems. Those are big barriers, but we’re overcoming them.

The threat that’s been posed to us over the last three or four years from the People’s Republic of China has galvanized a lot of allies and partners of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. There’s an impetus for us to work even closer together moving forward.

What near-term spending is on the horizon?

We’re investing in pre-positioned assets. That includes the kits with the tools and equipment that are necessary to do the maintenance on those aircraft. We’re investing in fuel bladders, in the renovation of the airfields, and in the airfield damage and repair equipment.

Think about heavy equipment — mobile aircraft arresting systems. Some of that stuff we have not put on a production line in a long time. We are investing in production lines to get that built and put in place within this Future Years Defense Program. We’re investing in communication equipment that will allow us to do command and control.

We’re investing in our airmen with multi-capable airman training. The Air Force Expeditionary Center at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, is putting together the curriculum that’s necessary for us to train our airmen and get them ready to have a civil engineer do not just civil engineering work, but maybe change a tire or load a bomb or refuel a jet or protect the base. It’s about investing in all those things that are necessary for us to get at a threat that, frankly, we just haven’t had to think about as much in the last 30 years.

When I came in, it was the Soviet Union, it was protecting the Fulda Gap in Germany. We learned a lot of skills that were multi-capable back in the late 1980s that we are now dusting off. We’re going to apply that to this near-peer fight.

But it has been difficult for the service to operate all of its maritime platforms amid recruiting and retention woes. In January 2023, a third of the Navy’s ships were docked due to a shortage of sailors, causing a loss of “significant flexibility,” the service’s top officer, Rear Adm. David Proctor, told Defense News at the time.

On Nov. 15, the Defense Ministry closed a request for information about replacing nearly the entire naval fleet. The Navy’s flagship — its 568-foot replenishment vessel HMNZS Aotearoa — has been in service for three years, but the remaining eight ships — two frigates, two inshore and two offshore patrol vessels, a sealift ship, and a dive and hydrographic ship — will reach the end of their service lives in the mid-2030s.

Defense News recently checked in with Proctor to discuss the state of the Navy, what’s planned for 2024 and ongoing efforts to strengthen the service. This interview was edited for length and clarity.

What responses have you received to the request for information for new ships?

A wide range of responses. Respondents included shipbuilders, system suppliers and maritime service providers, and the quality of information is an encouraging indication of interest in New Zealand’s defense. The responses are providing industry input to maritime fleet options in support of the Defence Capability Plan.

[Editor’s note: A New Zealand Defence Force spokesperson told Defense News after this interview the government received 49 responses to the RFI, but declined to provide further details.]

What’s next?

The development of the Defence Capability Plan is a process that explores a range of investment options to balance capability and resources. These options are assessed against extant defense policy. No decisions on specific ship types have been made at this point. The DCP will present investment options for government to consider.

Talk about the state of the Royal New Zealand Navy over the last year.

We have experienced a challenging year, with a declining workforce in 2023. Attrition is currently outstripping recruiting. But key measures and recruiting initiatives are underway to address this issue. The attrition rate is decreasing, indicating these initiatives are having a positive effect on addressing workforce issues.

How do you balance training against the deployment of forces?

The Royal New Zealand Navy is currently regenerating, following widely reported attrition and recruiting issues since the COVID-19 pandemic. This process is not without challenges as a result of the hollowness of the Navy.

In particular, the cohort where we are most short is needed to both keep the fleet at sea and to deliver specialist training ashore. This requires careful management and some compromise to maximize our ability to have ships at sea on operational deployments and/or providing at-sea training, while still being able to deliver world-class training ashore and transition to a sustainable training state.

What’s planned for the Navy in 2024?

The priorities for 2024 are to regenerate maritime capabilities in accordance with the Navy’s four-year regeneration plan, [which includes work on an integrated system to sustainably generate naval forces; a fresh focus on personnel capability to develop high-performing individuals and units; and a regeneration of combat capabilities]; continue the introduction and transition to new and upgraded capabilities; and improve maritime cooperation among Southwest Pacific partners by continuing to develop the effectiveness of the forum with Southwest Pacific heads of maritime forces.

As a small trading nation, New Zealand’s security is absolutely dependent on multinational organizations — like the World Trade Organization and the United Nations — and the rules-based international system to advance its interests. Specifically for the Royal New Zealand Navy, a number of key challenges and opportunities exist which, if achieved, would enable the service to improve its operational ability.

It is crucial that the Navy is able to continue reducing the current attrition rate and increase recruiting in order to regenerate the service and ensure the effective delivery of outputs.

As we continue to deliver our mission, which is to advance New Zealand’s interests from the sea as well as progress our strategic initiatives, we must also maintain our personnel and operational competencies as we transition to new capabilities. In addition, we must ensure that we put in place mechanisms that allow us to unlock the full potential and benefits from any new capabilities we are introducing. This will allow us to fully use the enhanced military platforms and technologies the government is investing in.

Gaining the right balance between effectiveness and efficiency is required to successfully introduce the future Navy while minimizing cost to New Zealanders. This will be done by ensuring we do the right things the right way so we can optimize effort and prioritize resources — for example, personnel, maintenance, finances, and ships and shore infrastructure.

Greater focus on capacity building within our region and the development of a body of knowledge on maritime security and strategic matters will continue to enhance the Navy’s position as subject matter experts in the maritime security domain. Increased engagement with partner navies, nongovernmental organizations, academic institutes and other government agencies will enhance the Navy’s ability to make a difference and will promote a wider understanding of the value of the service.

Of course, it’s worth noting the volatile security environment as well as the need to be ready to provide the government with options covering the full spectrum of maritime military operations, including combat and lethal force in defense of New Zealand, our allies and our interests.

How is recruiting going?

The Royal New Zealand Navy acknowledges that a naval candidate in 2024 is vastly different to one who would have joined in 2004. Access to technology and a reliance on fast responses can mean candidates may expect those same timelines from their recruiter. However, standardized assessment processes are required for us to accurately evaluate candidates and make sure we abide by our security, medical and academic standards.

This has involved robust action plans to enhance the recruiting approach, such as the development and publishing of operating processes, technical upgrades to operating systems, updates to minimum entry requirements, and the ongoing development of recruiters’ skills.

How are you balancing the varying levels of experience between new and seasoned sailors?

After a period of heightened attrition, the average level of experience across the Navy has fallen. Significant overseas ship deployments in both 2022 and 2023 have helped begin to rebuild these, as will deployments planned for 2024 and 2025.

A small but significant number of highly experienced subject matter experts have been used to provide guidance in their areas to those at sea and at the beginning of their careers.

What could the service gain from the trilateral AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States?

It remains to be seen what opportunities might exist for New Zealand under the second pillar of AUKUS, [which involves cooperative efforts to develop and field undersea capabilities, among other advanced technologies].

Decisions on this matter will be for ministers.

How has New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy affected the Navy?

The impact has been in relation to our Navy’s engagement with the U.S. Navy. But the relationship has largely moved beyond past differences over nuclear policy that impacted ship visits for a period of time. The Wellington Declaration of 2010 and the Washington Declaration of 2012 have enabled a notable reengagement between the two navies.

How do you view China’s maritime growth?

China continues to modernize its military. New Zealand is fully invested in collective security approaches alongside our key partners and in supporting the international rules-based system.

What is the Navy doing with uncrewed platforms at sea?

The Navy and Defence Force currently use a number of small uncrewed systems for a variety of tasks, and are undertaking experimentation to investigate their potential for greater use in a broader range of roles. In support of the Defence Capability Plan, the fleet is considering uncrewed capability as part of a solution set for the future Navy.

[Editor’s note: The military spokesperson also told Defense News the Bluebottle uncrewed surface vessel is set to undergo an initial confirmation of standard operating procedures, which would allow the Navy to build confidence and experience with the system as well as launch trials to support other government agencies, while gradually increasing range and duration of use around the country’s waters. The level of endurance the platform offers at sea, alongside its onboard cameras and radar, could benefit maritime patrol missions. The spokesperson noted Bluebottle is a quiet platform able to carry a towed array sonar.]

[The Navy leased the Martac-made Mantas T12 uncrewed surface vessel for three months in mid-2022. The spokesperson told Defense News the service used the platform to better understand such technology. Martac’s chief marketing officer, Stephen Ferretti, told Defense News in 2022 the T12′s sensors include electro-optical/infrared cameras for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, as well as multibeam, single-beam, side-scan and other sonar types for object detection and hydrographic surveying missions.]

A pivot away from the Greater Middle East, where it sunk decades of effort and manpower, to confront the wider ambitions of Russia and China is forcing the department to reevaluate how it collects its battlefield intelligence and the means through which it is shared. Long-range weapons, sensitive radars and powerful jammers mean the U.S. military must glean details from farther away while further insulating digital systems.

Bombardier Defense has taken note, according to Vice President Steve Patrick, and is investing internally to meet the changing demands. The company is among the winners of two recent U.S. Army intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance contracts, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and has been working overseas with Saab on early warning aircraft.

In an interview with C4ISRNET, Patrick said flexibility is key to satisfying the needs of modern militaries, as hurdles in Europe differ from those in the Indo-Pacific.

Portions of the conversation below were edited for length and clarity.

The U.S. Army has made clear it needs to see farther into enemy territory, strike harder from that greater distance and be more precise — all at the same time. They’ve dubbed part of the equation deep sensing. Where do you see that concept now and in the future, and how is Bombardier contributing?

I think deep sensing is part of the Army’s vision for the Multi-Domain Sensing System, the MDSS, as they call it. Really, it’s all about being able to see, as you say, farther into enemy territory, and the territory itself is farther away from the homeland.

There’s a real need for capability that allows you to not only see farther, but see farther from farther. So where Bombardier Defense can help in that equation is to bring our platforms to bear. Those platforms are designed to be high-altitude, long-endurance assets that can persist in and around the battlespace and give that ability to look further into enemy territory.

How does it play into this top priority of long-range fires that the Army has?

When you think of long-range fires, the additional word is precision. Precision implies that you need a target. If you’re going to have a target, you need to be able to surveil the area and to identify a target of interest.

Where the Bombardier platform plays is we provide that asset that hosts a radar, or some other sensor, that can identify the target and then pass it back to the command-and-control functions.

What is ‘deep sensing’ and why is the US Army so focused on it?

What makes this converted business jet a good candidate for serious military operations? What would you say to skeptics that believe maybe another option, or something more military hardened, is the better approach?

What we would say is that the attributes that the military needs from a platform are actually quite consistent with the attributes that some of our business-jet customers look for.

First of all, its reliability. The business customer expects the aircraft to perform when they need it, as does the military customer. The mission is critical. So reliability is important, as his performance. A lot of our aircraft have exceptional endurance, high altitude, high speed. They can operate from short runways. That performance gives flexibility to the military customers.

There’s also the fact that they are modern, in-production assets. Our aircraft are in production today. They are going to be in production for many years. So we deal with things like obsolescence and the latest technology in our course of business.

And then, perhaps, the biggest thing that brings the business jet into the equation is the advancement of technology. Twenty years ago, sensor payloads, radars, electronic equipment would fill a room the size of this. Now, that’s shrunk down to the size of maybe an iPhone — so a much smaller footprint to accommodate the same sensors. That makes a business jet very appealing in that market.

Bombardier is participating in the Army’s recently awarded ATHENA-R and -S contracts and the Air Force’s BACN. Why your aircraft? And what are some examples of the payloads?

Why our aircraft? It’s for the reasons I just indicated. It’s all about reliability, performance and availability of the airframe itself.

When we think of each of those missions, the BACN program with the Air Force, it’s really a communications node. Some call it flying Wi-Fi in the sky, linking together all the different waveforms from different users so that everyone can communicate on the same network over vast areas of terrain, whether it’s airborne, maritime or ground assets.

The Army programs, on the other hand, the ATHENA programs, those are really starting to look into intelligence gathering rather than communication, bringing onboard signals intelligence packages, radars, to provide the commanders on the ground with an overview of the battlespace.

L3Harris says Viper Shield electronic warfare tool for F-16s nears goal

Where is Bombardier Defense investing internally? What is the company interested in achieving in the near- or medium-term?

Bombardier Defense has been a part of Bombardier Aerospace for many, many years. What we’re now seeing, though, is an increased demand for our products and services. So we’re starting to build up our capability, predominantly in Wichita, Kansas, as the center of activity for engineering and modification.

What we’re bringing forward, what we’re investing in, is reusable solutions.

We find that many customers want additional electrical power, they want cooling capabilities, they want payload volumes. So we’re creating and investing in those kinds of capabilities, as well as our power plants, to make the aircraft almost a Swiss Army knife, ready to be used for multiple missions at very short notice. Highly reusable. Low cost. Rapid to deploy.

Bombardier recently delivered the seventh Global aircraft to Saab to be made into the early warning GlobalEye. How would you describe that international relationship, like you have around the U.S, and what are you hoping to achieve with that program?

One of the things that Bombardier Defense prides itself on is our collaboration with prime integrators. Whether it’s L3Harris Technologies, Sierra Nevada, Raytheon in the states, or Saab overseas, we have a very strong collaborative relationship.

The GlobalEye is a great example of how we work well with another prime mission-system integrator. Our platform, their system coming together to bring a great capability to the market.

The GlobalEye is an airborne early warning aircraft, fundamentally, but also with additional surveillance capabilities. In fact, Saab calls it the Swing Role Surveillance System. The aircraft has been very successful with its launch customer in the United Arab Emirates. We also have an additional customer in Sweden. Together with Saab, we see lots of opportunities around the world for this product, in markets in Asia and Europe, and then the Far East.

Do you foresee growth or additional opportunities for this contractor-owned, contractor-operated arrangement in the defense world?

I think the one thing we all see is a growing demand for intelligence. And how you satisfy that demand can be either through service-owned and -operated assets, or contractor-owned, contractor-operated assets in the COCO model.

We’re here to support both models, whether it be a direct sale to the government or to one of these third-party companies, our aircraft to their payload gives the capability very quickly.

How do you see aerial surveillance or electronic warfare needs changing depending on the theater? The Pentagon is currently trying to balance Russia and China, the Greater Middle East and Africa, et cetera.

The Pentagon has been quite clear with the idea of great power competition and the need to engage with China at distance. That requires a certain type of asset to be able to perform the mission at a long range.

The recent activity with Russia in Ukraine has, sort of, pivoted back towards Europe. It’s a different theater compared to the Far East. Perhaps what that underscores, most of all, is we don’t know exactly what the future theater will be. So you need to be flexible.

The way that we view the problem set is not to have a single solution for a single problem, but have a solution that can satisfy multiple problems, that is redeployable across the globe very quickly, that can be pivoted to where the current crisis is.

The Bombardier solutions, we think, fit that niche very well.

There’s hardly a better image of the demands faced by her staff. As deputy undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, Plumb is responsible for helping solve some of the Defense Department’s most vexing problems, from increasing industrial capacity to reforming the arcane Foreign Military Sales process.

Those tasks also involve supporting U.S. allies and partners — notably Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel.

The job has stretched the U.S. military’s stockpiles and challenged its ability to refill them; the White House has requested a $106 billion supplemental to address these problems.

Plumb spoke with Defense News on Nov. 7 about that funding request, U.S. security assistance and the Pentagon’s relationship with Capitol Hill. This interview was edited for length and clarity.

What is your focus as we enter a new year?

We’re focused on three big areas. The first is our industrial base. The conflict in Ukraine revealed fragility in that industrial base. Where we’re focused is really demonstrating that it has responded shockingly well.

Take 155mm artillery rounds as an example: We doubled production in the last 12 months. We’re looking to get to the point where we produce 80,000-100,000 by the end of 2025. And we’re doing that on lots of systems — Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, Patriots, Javelins.

The second big area is production diplomacy. We’ve made use of our allies and partners through a range of activities over the last several years, and it’s clear there’s a lot we can do with them. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante has focused on his role as the national armament director with both the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and NATO, but also more broadly on co-development, co-production and co-sustainment. We have a partnership with Japan on the glide phase interceptor [for hypersonic defense], looking at co-development and the pre-deployment phase. In co-production, we’re working with Australia on the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System. And on co-sustainment, we’re also working with Australia on a range of capacities and building on some of the work for AUKUS [the trilateral security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States]. That lets us have a different version of industrial base expansion.

The third big area is a consistent demand signal to industry. A lot of folks would think: “You have a large base budget, you buy lots of stuff in the department — that should be a signal to industry.” But what industry actually pays attention to is contracts. The faster we get things on contracts and the more predictable the funding can be, the better off we are.

We’re also working with Congress on a bunch of things that let us provide a longer-term, more consistent signal — multiyear procurements, economic order quantities, advanced procurements and a bunch of industrial base capacity expansion. At the end of the day, that’s what we’re looking to measure — surge capacity, but also resilience to unexpected events in the outside world.

“Consistent” and “predictable” do not come to mind when thinking about the appropriations process this year. To what extent does that process affect your ability to send a consistent demand signal?

It’s not good. Many of us who have been doing this for a while are used to having these continuing resolutions. We’re seeing increased delays and higher levels of churn. The problem with continuing resolutions is we can’t do new contracts, at the very least. That means subcontracts to suppliers can’t happen. Ultimately it means you can’t hire a workforce. That means if you have supply chains where there are cross-dependencies, you’re growing exponentially in delays rather than linearly.

For example, for 2024 we have some counter-unmanned aerial system investments planned, with a planned delivery in the 2024-2025 time frame. Let’s say we delay the continuing resolution; we get a 90-day delay. That 90 days means once the appropriation is received, we need to notify Congress. That’ll add another month. You’re now 120 days in. Then you’ve got to finish negotiating the contract, award the contract and then start making the advanced procurements. That’s four to eight more weeks. Then you add onto that the subcontract, so that’s another two to four weeks. That assumes that the delays, which maybe the prime contractors can absorb, don’t hit subcontractors particularly hard because they need the cash flow. We’re looking at 90- to 200-day delays in key systems that we know we need for the safety and security of warfighters — [all of which happened] because we just can’t get to a deal on appropriation.

The president’s supplemental request includes $50 billion for the defense-industrial base. What would that mean for the U.S. economy and the rate of production?

The first thing it looks like is a strong signal to the industrial base that we are going to continue to invest in these capabilities to buy back both U.S. readiness as well as support allies and partners. That continued drumbeat of investment allows industry to put its own skin in the game in terms of capital investments. The signal value is incredibly powerful, especially right now, to feel like this is not caught up in D.C. turmoil.

The second piece of it is the dollar flow. That means that industry literally starts building factory lines, moving in machines and hiring for its workforce; that has community benefits. We’re starting to look at where those dollars are flowing geographically because there is an economic infusion happening in many states across the country, particularly across the Midwest and the South. That has a meaningful economic impact right now in those local communities.

The place America is in manufacturing didn’t happen overnight, and we’re not going to get out of it overnight. Part of getting us into a resilient and robust manufacturing state of play involves making sure we can build those communities and those local investments so that you have the workforce, you have the people and you have the capital infrastructure.

The Defense Department has said supporting Taiwan and Ukraine is not a zero-sum game. But with Israel now at war, how has the situation changed?

Can we do all of these conflicts simultaneously? Absolutely. There’s some overlap in systems or some underlap in systems, and the two things that revealed are, one, that we really do need this manufacturing investment. I don’t want to sugarcoat the fact that there is fragility there.

The other piece is that in all of these conflicts, there is this high-tech/low-tech combination. Take Ukraine as an example: You’ve got trenches being dug out with mortars. You’ve also got a complex electronic warfare environment. In Israel, there is a range of tactics that look very familiar to folks who lived through all of the counterterrorism operations in the past, with a lot more targeting and specialized techniques. That’s a reminder for us in the department that our strategy is to increase production, but it also has to be about encouraging advanced techniques.

Talk about the upcoming National Defense Industrial Strategy and what it might contain.

What the strategy is intended to do is connect high-level policies to specific actions that the department is going to take, and then [help determine] how we want to measure progress.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin tasked a tiger team to make recommendations for improving the Foreign Military Sales process. What has come of that?

On the acquisition and sustainment side, we have two big areas we’ve been working on. One looks at procurement award lead time, where we’re looking to set baseline metrics and then track contracting cycle timelines more closely to try to improve responsiveness. We’ve collected the data and we’re setting the baselines. The goal in the next 12 months is to [determine whether the procurement lead time impacts FMS or is not a real cause of delay].

The second big area is aggregate demand work. What has been happening to date prior to the FMS tiger team is we sent our demand signal to industry. Other countries have their demand signal that pre-negotiates with industry, and the industry aggregates it all up. But everyone has a piece of information, and no one has the total information. We’re working with our partners in the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and our prime industry partners to basically create an aggregate demand picture in a set of priority munition areas that are relatively high-demand areas.

[That group] is identifying the high-demand areas, some of which are related to air defense and key munitions, and then figuring out the process to get that aggregate demand — the key being you don’t want to wait all the way until you have a formal letter exchange, but you don’t want to do it too early and skew the demand process.

We’re entering a year when U.S. military stockpiles will probably experience extreme demands. What is the state of those stockpiles?

Thinking about the stockpile is thinking about it from the supply side, but the way I’d rather think about it is on the demand side. We know that our partners have demands for certain kinds of capabilities. A lot of the work our acquisition and sustainment team does with our partners in policy and with the combatant commands is [about fulfilling a materiel need] by looking across the range of systems we have in our stockpiles, and what is hot on production lines, and where can we rapidly increase production and reprioritize deliveries to meet the aggregate demand.

Stockpiles are a thing we manage strategically to maintain readiness. You’ve heard everyone from the president on down to Dr. LaPlante say we’re going to prioritize the readiness of our forces. But we have a lot of tools at our disposal to meet different demands.

WASHINGTON — During his 30 years as a financial and national security expert in the public and private sector, David Norquist has seen the U.S. government’s budget process devolve from a fairly reliable funding method to a nearly perennial source of dysfunction.

In all but one of the last 15 budget cycles, the Pentagon was forced to rely on continuing resolutions — a stopgap measure that funds agencies at the same level as the previous year — for varying amounts of time.

Earlier this year, Congress passed a short-term spending bill set to expire Nov. 17. And if January rolls around without the government’s overdue spending bill for fiscal 2024 in place, a full-year continuing resolution — with a 1% cut to all federal agencies, including the Defense Department — will kick in.

What most concerns Norquist, who now leads the National Defense Industrial Association, is the normalization of continuing resolutions. But the regularity of CRs, Norquist said, should not obscure the harm and disruption they cause to the Pentagon and the defense industry — particularly as the U.S. tries to restock its weapons inventory and prepare for a potential fight against China.

Norquist, who has experience supporting Army intelligence, has served as the Pentagon’s deputy defense secretary and comptroller, and held the role of chief financial officer in the Department of Homeland Security. He also worked as a professional staff member with the House Appropriations Committee’s defense panel.

Norquist spoke to Defense News on Nov. 2 about temporary spending measures and the impact on military suppliers. This interview was edited for length and clarity.

How do continuing resolutions affect the Defense Department?

No new starts, no quantity increases, and typically the dollar amount is tied to the prior years, which means you don’t usually get inflation [adjustments].

From 2016 to 2019, the department was very concerned about munitions, and every year it asked for an increase in Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, and every year it got a CR. By having CRs each time, [the government has] delayed the ramp-up of production of a munition it already knew it needed, and now it’s living with the consequences.

A CR does that across the board. Even at its cleanest, it puts a brake on the things that you know you need to do.

What does that mean for defense firms?

One concern that people have about the defense-industrial base is that the number of companies willing to do business with the U.S. government is continuing to shrink, and that’s created a problem with competition. If you are a firm thinking about doing business with the government and you see this, why would you [work with the government]?

No one in the private sector freezes their behavior for three months, and then asks you to come back after that long wait and start producing the thing they negotiated with you months ago.

And it can be very disruptive. For one of the companies we work with, there’s an uncertainty about how much money an agency is going to get under a CR and whether there would be stop-work orders. The company would have to lay off a significant number of its employees. Those employees would go collect unemployment compensation, and then when the bill is enacted, the government would say: “Can you bring your people back?” Well, they’d have to go find them and hire them, or train new ones. You may have to wait on those new employees to get clearances, which means now you’ve got another delay.

This drives up the cost to the U.S. government because companies have to recover the workforce, or it simply drives firms out of the market who decide they just don’t want this hassle.

Why else might companies choose to either drop out of the defense industrial base or opt not to join it at all?

This is a form of a barrier to entry that drives out those firms that you’re most interested in getting into the business — and people in new technology areas who are used to moving much faster. High-tech firms are used to turning things in just several months, and now they’re dealing with a government buyer that is putting on the brakes. That’s not the world where they operate, and that’s not how innovation works. And so you become a very unappealing customer.

What’s the likelihood the U.S. government reaches the point in January when 1% cuts start to kick in?

There is a very high risk of the CR lasting until January. The intent of that 1% was to force people to reach an agreement before they went into the second quarter. We’ll see whether it worked as intended. I’m always hopeful they will come to an agreement and resolve things earlier. But the track record is not necessarily positive.

How would that 1% cut impact defense?

It’s a very labor-intensive, disruptive effect. It will have a significant effect on readiness and training of the force because that’s one of the first places that it hits. It’ll have an effect on a series of acquisition programs. Keep in mind we’re looking at an environment where China’s capabilities are growing, its inventories of missiles are growing.

This budget cut would go in the exact wrong direction for what everyone understands to be the pacing threat. You’ll have firms that will exit; you’ll have cost increases on systems because you’re now buying an inefficient quantity; and you’ll have parallel disruptions throughout the Defense Department in training, readiness and flying hours.

What defense programs would be most acutely affected by a full-year CR?

The Defense Department’s budget talks about significant increases in missiles and munitions and in space. What a year-long CR would say is: “We understand that those are your most pressing challenges. Don’t do anything about them. Act as if you’re going to do what you did last year, which you already know is insufficient, and instead spend the money in the areas that you’ve decided are lower priority.”

How does that affect the Pentagon’s effort to bolster munitions capacity and recover its stockpiles, particularly after nearly two years of arming Ukraine?

It creates a real problem. The conflict in Ukraine showed us what wartime consumption looked like. The U.S. defense-industrial base was sized to peacetime consumption — for training purposes or to replace one retiring generation with another. It shows you that what we currently buy is not the quantity the U.S. would need if it were involved in a conflict.

The department looked at the budget and said, “We need to be better positioned with long-range anti-ship missiles, precision-strike missiles, those types of platforms [if a conflict erupted],” and it asked for an increase.

A long CR would say: “We’re going to extend and perpetuate a shortfall in the very munitions that we believe we need for the security of the United States.”

[That also harms] your ability to deter — to convince somebody not to pick a conflict with you — because you’re showing them you have a weakness that you’re unable to close.

What do you think of new House Speaker Mike Johnson’s chances of helping Congress avoid a long-term CR?

I have optimism that, having been selected by the full range of the Republican Party, he has a level of unity to be able to move bills, negotiate, and try to get things back into regular order that the GOP did not have when it was leaderless [following the ouster of former Speaker Kevin McCarthy] or when different [factions] were in conflict.

The goal is to try individually negotiating the appropriations bills. The return to regular order is not a bad thing. The question is whether people can reach solutions that are right for the country, can move through the House and the Senate, and get signed into law.

I spoke at the 2017 Defense News Conference, and this was the subject. It’s a little bit sad that we are having the exact same conversation, with all of the same challenges and problems. “Groundhog Day” was a really funny movie, but it’s not the way you run the Department of Defense or our nation’s security.

His committee in May advanced a series of bipartisan recommendations for Congress to enact in hopes of deterring China from attacking Taiwan — which Beijing considers a rogue province and has threatened to take back by force. Those recommendations included fixing the $19 billion Taiwan arms sale backlog, establishing the Taiwan reserves stockpile, implementing multiyear munitions procurement, passing cybersecurity legislation for Taiwan and more.

Gallagher sat down with Defense News to discuss the status of those recommendations, the United States’ beleaguered munitions-industrial base, Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea, his plans for the committee to visit Taiwan and whether he would also visit China.

This Oct. 26 interview was edited for length and clarity.

The cybersecurity bill recommended by the China-focused committee is part of the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, which is still under debate. But where do the other recommendations stand within the House? What more needs to be done?

I think the latest count was at seven of the 10 in our attempt for Taiwan to have some form of representation in the NDAA. Obviously, the NDAA is not yet done. I’m a conferee. My hope is that we can keep it seven of 10 in the NDAA, or at least make meaningful progress therein. There are some things, like multiyear procurement and appropriations, that need to be adjudicated via defense appropriations.

The supplemental is also an opportunity to advance in the direction of some of our recommendations. Of the $106 billion, there’s really only $2 billion geared toward Taiwan. That’s woefully insufficient. I mean, honestly, that’s kind of a joke. And it’s not even Taiwan-specific — I assume because there were elements of the administration that didn’t want to anger China by specifically saying $2 billion in foreign military financing was for Taiwan.

We still have until the end of the year to finalize our other policy recommendations and other areas beyond military competition.

The president used his drawdown authority within the past year and a half, mostly for Ukraine, but also for Taiwan and Israel. The types of munitions sent by the U.S. differ, but there is overlap. For instance, the government sent Ukraine Harpoon missiles, which then need replaced in U.S. stocks. The U.S. industrial base has a lot of production constraints, so at what point can U.S. military stockpiles no longer sustain this level of drawdown, and which region should get priority?

The Indo-Pacific is our priority theater. I don’t mean to suggest it’s an either-or choice because we need to continue to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine to help them beat the Russians. Israel’s a priority as well. But the Indo-Pacific has to remain our top priority because a collapse of deterrence in the region would have the potential to make the ongoing war in Ukraine and the emerging war in Gaza look tame in comparison.

One solution, which I unsuccessfully tried to push, but I’m hoping to revive, that would rebuild our entire arsenal of deterrence is to maximize production rates of all the critical munitions and long-range precision fires. My list probably looks similar to the list the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, Bill LaPlante, would come up with in the Pentagon. The Long Range Anti-Ship Missile would be at the top of my list, and the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, the Joint Direct Attack Munition Extended Range, the Standard Missile-6, the Naval Strike Missile, etc.

You could agree on the most critical munitions that you need to stockpile, and then you need maximum production rates and to provide certainty over the course of the Future Years Defense Program.

We have an opportunity right now to make a generational investment in our ossified and broken munitions-industrial base. We’re not there yet, notwithstanding the brittleness of that base that Ukraine has revealed.

Some Republican defense hawks asked you to run for speaker of the House after Rep. Kevin McCarthy was forced out of the role, but you turned them down. Why?

I think my highest and best use to not just the Republican caucus, but the country, is as chair of the Select Committee on the CCP and working on issues related to the U.S.-China competition — on the hard power component specifically. The mission I’ve given myself in Congress is to deter a war with China and to prevent World War III. That’s the most pressing national security challenge. I want to give that everything I got, and the speakership is something I’ve never considered. My focus is on winning this new Cold War with communist China.

On Oct. 22, Chinese ships collided with a Philippine military supply vessel in the South China Sea. You’ve called for additional measures to support the U.S.-Philippine defense treaty, which would include establishing a more secure and permanent foothold in the contested Second Thomas Shoal. What does that look like? What should President Joe Biden do?

We’ve talked about the supplemental before. There’s some thinking that of the $2 billion in foreign military financing, half a billion could be used for the Philippines.

At a broader level, we need to ensure the Marine Corps’ vision of having small teams of Marines running around southern Japanese and northern Philippine islands with autonomous Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, armed with Naval Strike Missiles. That would create serious dilemmas for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army planners.

If you think about our stand-in forces, our biggest asymmetric advantage is our submarines. By adding that, things can get really exciting. That’s something we could accomplish within the next five years before the 2027 timeline emerges [the year President Xi Jinping hopes the People’s Liberation Army will be ready for a possible Taiwan attack].

What basing and access agreements would that require? I don’t know, and I give the administration credit for some of the basing and access agreements they’ve gotten with the Philippines and with Japan in recent years. It did seem like under the previous administration, the Philippines was sliding out of our orbit or the alliance was weakening, and they were trending more toward the Chinese Communist Party. Now, that seems to have changed and things are headed in a much better direction. But it’s important that we maintain our presence there and that our funding is consistent.

I do like that we’re saying an attack on Philippine forces in the Second Thomas Shoal would trigger our mutual defense commitments. It’s important that we signal that, but we’ve got to be prepared to back that up.

As the Biden administration expands basing agreements and security cooperation with Pacific allies, China’s talking point is that this is a Cold War mentality. You’ve framed U.S. relations with China as a new Cold War. Does this framing make diplomacy and de-escalation more difficult?

I don’t think so. To clarify, my view is that China and Russia have been waging a Cold War against us for quite some time. It at least started in 2012 when having unsuccessfully tried to make specious legal claims for disputed territory related to the Philippines, China began its aggressive and unprecedented island-building campaign and the militarization of that campaign. We can either recognize that fact and wage a counter-effort aggressively, or we can lose this thing because of our lack of urgency and ignorance. This is not to say the new Cold War is identical to the old; I find the analogy useful both for the similarities and the differences it illuminates.

This is a whole-of-society effort. It’s going to require us to modernize our national security bureaucracy. This isn’t just two militaries competing, but two separate ideologies and two separate ways of organizing governance. It’s as much of an ideological competition as it is a military-economic competition.

The economic side of it is where I think the differences really emerge. We never had to contemplate some form of selective economic decoupling from the Soviet Union because our economies didn’t interact.

That’s what makes it more complex and in some ways more difficult than the old Cold War. We’ve woken up to the fact that we are unacceptably dependent on China for the production of certain things: critical goods — certainly the pandemic was a wake-up call in that respect, advanced pharmaceutical ingredients, critical mineral processing, subcomponent parts for solar panels, electric vehicle batteries. [The U.S. needs to] figure out how to wean ourselves off that dependency, restore some level of economic sovereignty, or at a minimum stop fueling our own destruction by allowing the outflow of U.S. capital to China in certain advanced technological and military sectors.

What about the flurry of diplomacy in recent months?

I’ve been critical of what I call “zombie engagement” by the Biden administration. The problem isn’t engaging in diplomacy per se; it is pausing defensive action to just sit down at the table and talk with high-level Chinese Communist Party officials. These talks seem to go on and on and on, or we commit to working groups and then nothing happens. Thus far, we’ve had multiple Cabinet-level officials go to Beijing with really nothing to show for it.

There are still some in the administration who believe we have to pull our punches with respect to China because we don’t want to anger them and thereby jeopardize their willingness to work with us on reducing climate emissions. That’s a naive view of the world. I don’t think Xi Jinping cares about commitments made at [the climate change conferences]. I want to make sure that when we are engaging in diplomacy, it’s backed by a credible military deterrence.

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., recently led a bipartisan congressional delegation to China. It sounds like you aren’t inclined to do that.

I’m genuinely interested in talking to the senators that went on that trip to hear how it went. I’d be curious if they thought it was productive or if it was just kind of sitting in nondescript, gray rooms getting a lecture by wolf warrior diplomats. So I’m not hostile to the idea; I would want it to actually be meaningful and productive.

There are some other trips to the Indo-Pacific we have prioritized that we’re trying to do. But the congressional schedule keeps changing because we depose speakers and then argue about it for weeks.

Before McCarthy was ousted as speaker, he had backed off his initial pledge to emulate former Speaker Nancy Pelosi by visiting Taiwan. But he did meet Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in the U.S. After Pelosi’s visit, China ratcheted up drills around Taiwan and suspended cooperation on countering fentanyl trafficking. Did McCarthy make the right choice by meeting Tsai in the U.S. instead of in Taiwan?

I defended Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. It’s entirely in keeping with precedent and is the intent of the Taiwan Relations Act. I understand the CCP threw a fit about it, but they also threw a fit at the idea of President Tsai meeting with Speaker McCarthy and members of the committee on American soil. So no matter what we do, they’ll claim it’s a provocation, and so we can’t be intimidated by that rhetoric. I thought former Speaker McCarthy handled the whole situation brilliantly.

For our committee, that trip out to California to meet with President Tsai at the Reagan Library in a bipartisan fashion was incredibly powerful. Speaker McCarthy set a very bipartisan tone. The interaction with President Tsai was very robust, meaningful and a very good outcome.

Separately, I went to Taiwan myself. We’re hoping to take the committee to Taiwan, and I think that will be a very useful thing to do.

For the Navy, that took the form of missiles, submarines and unmanned systems.

More recently, however, Bill LaPlante, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, has said developing and prototyping these high-end systems is important, but not the end game.

Research and development “without procurement, production, is interesting — but doesn’t really matter,” he said in September at the Air and Space Forces Association’s annual conference, leaving the audience with the message: “production, production, production.”

Two weeks later, he told another audience, “production is what matters, and everything else follows from that.”

Jay Stefany, the acting assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition, sat down with Defense News to discuss what this focus on production looks like for the Navy, what the service’s contracting arm is up to, and more.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

What are your top priorities for fiscal 2024?

Production in a number of places: certainly where we need to expand our production capacity to meet demand, like in the submarine world, or in some of our munitions programs where we’ve been at a minimum rate for decades and now we need to expand to meet global needs. So there’s the expansion of production capability.

We have programs that are about to go into production, and we want to make sure that goes as smoothly as possible: frigate comes to mind, MQ-25 is another one. I want to get them started in their production mode, get that good foundation going.

Then there’s getting commercial technology where it can be used to meet a warfighting requirement — which some can, some can’t —but where it can, let’s get into a case where we’re actually going to go build a bunch of that and get it out there quickly. We’ve experimented with it; let’s go from experimentation to actually fielding, where it meets a fleet gap or requirement.

What commercial technology are you considering for use by the fleet?

Certainly some of the non-warfighting unmanned capabilities, either undersea or on the sea, gliders and things that sense the environment and provide back environmental sensing.

But I’m also looking at where we can bring additive manufacturing capability or new technology into ship repair or submarine repair, which is just as important as getting that technology where it can be used on the warfighting side.

For example: “Hey, Carnival cruise line, how do you use technology to repair your cruise ships and get them in and out on time?” Which they do very well, and maybe we can use some of that technology in our repair world.

How do issues like inflation and labor affect the broader issue of production?

The focus would be: Is the workforce there? Do we have the material there to actually sustain production? Do we have a sustained capability coming in from the suppliers? Do we actually have the production plans that we’ve proved work?

The workforce today is less experienced because of the generational shift, so we actually need better documentation of what they’re doing in their work instructions, whether it’s paper or whether that’s on an iPad.

So those would be the three main things: Do we have the right documentation for the right workforce matched up? And then, do we have the material to continue doing it, as opposed to starting and waiting?

You also serve as the F-35 acquisition authority, in addition to your job as Navy acquisition chief. The fighter jet has faced production delays this year due to challenges with the Technology Refresh-3 upgrade. How are you solving the TR-3 problems and getting the production line ready to deliver aircraft again?

TR-3 would be the hardware and software suite upgrade that then would allow for some of the higher-end processing capabilities that would come in a Block 4 capability package. The TR-3 upgrades were supposed to go to the aircraft that are delivering this year. There are lots of developmental issues going forward; we’re actually now in the flight test area. Lockheed Martin has maybe 10% to 15% of the flight tests done that are required.

The software has all the capability in it. But getting some of those critical metrics to the maturity level so that we can go do those flight tests has been the most recent holdup.

The flight test program we expect to be completed — at least to the point where we are confident in the outcome and can start accepting aircraft again — in March or April at the earliest, maybe more like June at the latest. That’s kind of your bracket of when we’re looking to start accepting aircraft, with either the flight test program complete, or at least complete enough that we’re confident the last piece of it will get done.

Are you expecting a domino effect on aircraft deliveries?

It will probably take six to nine months to catch up. It’s not like: “OK, the software works. Now we’re going to deliver 100 airplanes tomorrow.” We have to work our way through the final delivery process as well as the new ones coming on.

How are you and the F-35 Joint Program Office working through some of the ongoing F-35 readiness issues as part of the so-called war on readiness?

Program Executive Officer Lt. Gen. Michael Schmidt has a really good approach in what he calls a war on readiness, and he actually created a top 10 list of degraders of all three models. It turns out perhaps the top five of those 10 are the same in all three models [the “A” model the Air Force flies, the “B” model the Marine Corps flies, and the “C” model the Marine Corps and Navy fly]. So going after those first — canopies, the electro-optical [distributed aperture system] — those come to mind. But he’s targeting those that go across all models first.

And then looking at the [operational- and intermediate-level] maintenance that are done, are there things we can have sailors and Marines out there doing to keep the engines on the wing longer? Or for whatever it is that’s degrading: “Hey, if I changed my [operational]-level maintenance, I can get more life.” In the engines, we saw that was a case where, by doing a little more out in the field, we could significantly reduce the number of engines that had to come off and go back to the depot. It’s that kind of mentality going forward, and the identification of it and actually having some money to go work on those things, which the JPO does have in this year’s budget. I expect to see all three mission-capable rates go up noticeably.

What contracting initiatives are on your plate?

One of the things that we started with under [former Navy acquisition chief Hondo] Geurts, and we’ve continued, is the idea that we would like to obligate more money each year with fewer contracting actions in order to free up time for our contracting officers and our program team to actually do more bigger-picture, strategic stuff, as opposed to the more transactional stuff.

This past year, $151 billion worth of obligations, which is the most we’ve ever done in contracting or obligating money. Contracting actions are getting lower and lower, and we’ve hit the lowest number of contracting actions [since this effort began in FY20] at 199,000. So the idea of more work done with fewer contracting actions — that’s one.

We’re also seeing a trend in the contracting officer world of higher attrition [than other parts of the workforce]. It’s a hard thing to do. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro has encouraged us to look at ways to retain that workforce. It’s not so much recruiting them; it’s that once they get up to speed, it is just hard work, and we need to make opportunities for them to want to stay.

We also had a record year for small business contracting. So of the [small business-eligible portion of the total spending in FY23], $20 billion of that was direct to small business prime contractors.

And then there’s more innovative contracting, like other transaction authorities. [In FY22], we were at about a billion dollars of other transaction authorities. In FY23, we ended up at $2.7 billion. So a large increase in how much we are using — and a 59% increase in the actual number of OTAs.